Africa: the West and Russia in search of allies there

This week, Russia and the West have opened a new front in their struggle for influence since the start of the Ukrainian conflict. The setting is Africa, the goal being to win allies for their geopolitical interests. This week, the continent has been visited by two prominent figures: Emmanuel Macron, the French president, and Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister. The former visited Cameroon, Benin and Guinea-Bissau, while the latter visited Egypt, the Republic of Congo, Uganda and Ethiopia.

The countries visited were not chosen at random. In France's case, the focus on West Africa is most likely due to the fact that the region's proximity to the Sahel, whose terrorism is increasingly approaching its borders. This forces France, which is withdrawing its military presence in Mali, to reinforce its credibility as a priority partner for the countries in the region, countering Russia. Moscow has in its favour the continent's heavy dependence on Russian wheat and fertilisers, both of which are blocked by international sanctions. An example of this is Egypt, the world's largest importer of wheat, mostly Russian. In this respect, it is key to get the approval of the African Union (AU), whose headquarters are in the Ethiopian capital. 

In the French case, the visits have been marked by the dilemma of what should take precedence in French-African relations: security or the defence of human rights and the recognition of colonialist evil. Security in the face of terrorism has taken precedence over human rights, even if the leaders of Cameroon and Benin are autocrats. In both countries Macron has pledged to guarantee their security, promising to send military equipment to equip the military forces of both countries. There have been symbolic gestures of 'reconciliation' with France's troubled colonial past, such as the inauguration in Benin of an exhibition of works returned by France to the African country. However, Macron has not called on both countries to respect human rights. The latter is relevant given that both countries have authoritarian regimes and Cameroon suffers from a linguistic conflict between the English-speaking regions in the east and the rest of the country, which is French-speaking. Nor has there been any progress in the French revision of its colonial legacy in a country that experienced a brutal civil war for independence between 1955-1971. This is coupled with Macron's criticism of Russia's presence on the continent in a country that signed a security agreement with Russia in May and abstained in the UN vote to sanction Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. Such criticism is likely to reinforce Cameroon's decision to opt for Moscow as its security guardian, as unlike France, Russia has no colonial past on the continent. As for Benin, it will be necessary to see how the terrorist threat in the Sahel evolves, especially if it crosses the borders of Porto-Novo, in order to assess the effectiveness of French military assistance. 

For Moscow, the main objective of its African tour is to convince African countries - dependent on Russian and Ukrainian wheat and fertilisers for their livelihoods - that Moscow is not responsible for their rising prices, which could lead to famine on the continent. He will also try to curry favour with the countries visited so that they do not support sanctions against Moscow. At this point, Russia has the advantage of exploiting the abstention of the continent's countries in the vote to sanction Russia at the United Nations as proof of the weakness of Western foreign policy. However, the abstention of these countries is a double-edged sword for Russia, for while they do not support the West, they are not interested in supporting Moscow either, in a continent where dependence on the West and increasingly on China for infrastructure and development is very high. Russia has understood this game and is making efforts to build infrastructure: in Egypt Russia will build a power plant and in the Republic of Congo an oil pipeline. In terms of political values, Moscow is more in tune with African countries than the West on the primacy of security over human rights, which is key to facilitating Russian diplomacy on a continent where authoritarianism is on the rise. 

In conclusion, the Ukrainian war is also played out on the diplomatic terrain, especially in the search for allies according to the geopolitical visions of Moscow and the West. Africa is the theatre of operations for these manoeuvres, as we have seen this week with the visits of France and Russia to countries on the continent. Paris prioritises security over human rights and the revision of the colonialist legacy, as well as criticising the Russian presence. Such criticism will only reinforce the dependence on Russia of countries such as Cameroon, which has a security agreement with Russia. The delivery of military aid will depend on terrorism in the Sahel, especially if it spreads to West Africa and how the armed forces of these countries react to the threat. Russia has the trump card of continental dependence on its wheat and fertiliser and refraining from sanctioning it over the Ukrainian conflict. However, it does not have an active infrastructure investment policy on par with the West and China, which is key to winning support on the continent. Moscow is orienting its policy in this regard, investing in oil pipelines and power plants in Egypt and the Republic of Congo. 

Developments in the Ukrainian war will determine the success or failure of the West's and Russia's strategy to win support in Africa. This week's visits by Paris and Moscow demonstrate that winning the support of African countries is key in the struggle for global influence unleashed by the Ukrainian conflict.