Change of plans for Mohamed bin Salman

Mohamed bin Salman - abbreviated as MBS by the Western press - is undoubtedly one of the leading figures of the last five years in Middle Eastern politics. His rise began in 2015 when his father, the octogenarian Salman bin Abdulzaziz, became King of Saudi Arabia and appointed him defence minister. Two years later, Mohamed was designated successor of the country's throne, making him the de facto strongman of the Saudi government. MBS, born in 1985, represents the generational relay in a family that until recently had been dominated by the 'seven sudairis', the main sons of the founder of the Saudi kingdom, Abdulaziz bin Saud, who died in 1953. 

Since his arrival in power, the young Saudi Arabian prince has carried out an aggressive diplomacy, accompanied by efforts to improve the country's image and present it as a regime in the midst of modernization. He has also promoted the 'Vision 2030' strategic framework, with ambitious plans for urban development and tourism promotion aimed at reducing the Kingdom's dependence on oil. However, the pandemic and the resulting economic crisis have disrupted the successor's plans, which were already risky and had not yet yielded the expected results. The global economic crisis and the fall in oil prices will greatly reduce the capacity of the Saudi Arabian coffers to finance the plans of MBS, which may be forced to change some of its policies. 

One of the Saudi prince's main bets has been foreign policy, much more interventionist than that of his predecessors. In 2015, MBS decided to actively involve his country in the Yemeni civil war and assumed the leadership of the coalition of Arab monarchies in support of President Hadi. Five years later, the operation has been described as the Saudi Vietnam: despite the enormous amount of money, weapons and human lives invested by the Saudis, their army and armed forces have not only failed to break the Huthi rebels, but have also been unable to prevent attacks on Saudi territory itself. In addition, MBS's strategy has been criticised for its human rights violations: the bombings have caused numerous civilian casualties, Saudi troops have been accused by Human Rights Watch of being responsible for torture and disappearances, and the naval blockade has led to shortages and famine among the Yemeni population.

Another diplomatic front opened by the Crown Prince has been the conflict with Qatar, active since 2017. The differences arose because of Qatar's support for groups contrary to Saudi interests, such as the Muslim Brothers, as well as the good relationship of the Al-Thani emirate with Iran, with whom they share some underwater gas reserves. The confrontation has not led to violence, but the economic consequences of the blockade have been felt in Qatar. The dispute remains open and this year's negotiations have not been successful. For the time being, MBS maintains its leadership among the majority of Arab monarchies and Egypt, which since the beginning of the clash have supported and imitated the Saudi pressure measures.

Bin Salman has also cultivated good relations with the US government, although the prince's reputation in the West has suffered especially since the murder of columnist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul. The Saudi intelligence services' attempt to blackmail Jeff Bezos - founder of Amazon and owner of the Washington Post, the newspaper in which Khashoggi published - has also done much damage to the image of the heir to the throne. To counteract this, Saudi diplomacy has invested many millions in publicity and public relations, as well as in international events and sporting events such as the final of the Spanish Super Cup in 2019. Advertising campaigns, consisting of both traditional ads and advertorials as well as social media sponsorships, have focused on showing Saudi Arabia as an attractive destination for tourism and business, one of the pillars of the Vision 2030 plan. In addition, MBS has sought to present itself as a modernizing and human rights-friendly prince that promotes openness measures, such as lifting the ban on driving for women. The strategy has had some success, as despite the prince's bad reputation, foreign investment in Saudi Arabia has increased in recent years.

However, MBS's plans have come up against an unforeseen event. The global crisis caused by the coronavirus, added to the drop-in oil prices due to the trade war between Russia and Saudi Arabia, threatens to leave the Kingdom's coffers without a budget - revenues have been reduced by more than 20% during the last quarter. In addition to delaying the implementation of Vision 2030, the Saudis have been forced to take austerity measures. The main one has been the increase in VAT from 5 to 15 per cent. The highly unpopular tax was introduced only in 2017. In addition, the Government has withdrawn a wage supplement for public sector employees, where one in three working Saudis work. These measures have been accompanied by a budget cut, although the Saudi Government has also sought to support local entrepreneurs by providing interest-free loans.

Saudi Arabia has traditionally been a very low-tax country, as the country's natural wealth has made it possible to finance public services and provide subsidies to the population in return for the absence of political rights. Although there are dissidents - many of them imprisoned or exiled - and areas of conflict and oppression such as the Shiite region of Al-Hasa, a large part of the Saudi population seems to support the royal family, or at least not to confront it. The little opposition is often expressed through Islamist motives, which is why the Saudis are trying to reduce the regional influence of groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. 

The economic crisis, however, may upset the social balance in Saudi Arabia. The development model that MBS was betting on, a transition from a commodity-producing economy to a provider of tourism and leisure goods and services, may not be viable in the immediate future because of the fear caused by the coronavirus. Unemployment is not yet a risk and all indications are that, if conditions do not improve in the medium term, the immigrant workforce - which represents more than a third of the country's total population - will gradually be replaced by local workers. In any case, social discontent is likely to increase in Saudi Arabia over the next year, although this need not pose a threat to the Crown Prince.

Traditionally, the main danger to Saudi rulers has been posed by disgruntled members of the royal family itself, as well as dissident clergy. MBS has already taken it upon itself to play down potential opponents within its family with a spectacular anti-corruption campaign in which more than 200 officials and businessmen have been arrested and have had their assets frozen. The prince has also publicly distanced himself from the more traditionalist clergy, an obstacle to his development plans, which include increasing the presence of Western investors and lifting some of the religious restrictions on entertainment venues. However, in the new context of austerity and economic uncertainty, the Saudi heir may need to reconcile himself with the clergy to maintain social peace.

Since his rise to power, Mohamed bin Salman has sought to isolate his opponents and centralize control of the country. However, the new circumstances make it more likely that the prince will give in and make concessions to his rivals within the regime. In particular, MBS must appease the older members of his family who are wary of his interventionist and ambitious policy. Otherwise, he risks being left alone and falling victim to a palace coup, as happened to his uncle Saud in 1964.