Opinion

China in the face of Russia's invasion

photo_camera xi-jinping

China and Russia have a complicated relationship. They are united by their authoritarian worldview and their opposition to the United States, but they are also rivals in Siberia and Central Asia. In relation to the Ukraine crisis, one might at first assume that the two countries would be aligned, and this seemed to be confirmed by Xi and Putin in Beijing at the opening of the Winter Olympics. There they issued a joint statement opposing "further NATO enlargement", calling on NATO to abandon "cold war mentality", and declared themselves against "the formation of closed blocs" which they described as "attempts by external forces to undermine security and stability in their common adjacent regions" (read Ukraine and the South China Sea). This prompted the NATO Secretary General to exclaim later that "what we are seeing is two authoritarian powers ... operating together". operating together". But at that time Russia had not invaded Ukraine. The question is whether Putin then revealed to Xi intentions that he concealed from the rest of the world until the last moment.

I am convinced that, whatever may be said, China must be very uncomfortable with Russia's invasion of Ukraine because it puts it in the difficult position of not being able to turn its back on its "strategic partner" - not ally, as foreign minister Wang Yi pointed out to avoid confusion, but without wishing to appear complicit in an atrocity from a humanitarian and international law point of view, an atrocity that also violates in one fell swoop three principles so dear to Chinese diplomacy: respect for state sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and the territorial integrity of states.

With Tibet, Hong Kong and Xinjiang, it certainly has good reason to do so. Only a few days ago Wang Yi reiterated China's support for "the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of any country", adding that "Ukraine is no exception". So Russia is on the one hand the country with which China shares a common vision of global governance, but on the other hand the country that is waging a war that runs counter to its principles and interests. As if that were not enough, China's trade with Europe ($830 billion annually) and the US ($750 billion) is ten times greater than its trade with Russia ($150 billion) and it is not in its interest to jeopardise it (the Americans have warned them that helping Russia now "would have consequences"), just as it is not in its interest to appear in the eyes of the world by backing an aggressor that kills civilians in a neighbouring country. Winning Russia (which it already has) in exchange for losing Europe is bad business. In addition, the crisis has led to increases in the price of gas and oil, which China consumes in large quantities, and uncertainty in the stock markets, which is not good for anyone and not even for China. If Ukraine does not export wheat it will be another bad news story. It is clear that China would have preferred Russia not to invade Ukraine and now finds itself with a hot potato.

No sooner had the invasion begun and while blaming NATO for not taking Russia's security interests into account, Xi told Macron that Russia and Ukraine "should seek a political agreement and a solution ... through dialogue", and the same was repeated a few days later by his foreign minister, who considered that such a solution should be based on the 2015 Minsk agreements. The fact is that although Kiev had seven years to do so, it never complied with those agreements, which provided for broad autonomy for the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and now, after Russia's recognition of their independence and the subsequent military attack on Ukraine, those agreements are dead.

Both China and Russia are united by their common opposition to the United States because they see it as preventing them from taking their rightful place in the world, even though they also believe that Washington lacks the will to fight and is in irretrievable decline. They are also united by their authoritarian character, which is why Xi Jinping may be the only leader who knows Putin's real intentions and what he really intends by invading Ukraine, as well as his red lines. For that reason and because he buys gas and oil from him, he may also be the only leader in a real position to influence Putin, after all the others who have visited Moscow in procession, from Scholz to Macron to Johnson, Blinken, Erdogan and Bennet, have failed to avoid war.

It cannot be said, as some say, that there have been no diplomatic efforts to stop the invasion. What has happened is that they have not been successful and that requires a redoubling of efforts, something for which in my opinion China is better placed than anyone else in the eyes of the Kremlin. Firstly because there is good chemistry between Putin and Xi, secondly because it is not suspicious in Moscow's eyes, and thirdly because China is the only country capable at the moment of easing the tough sanctions the world has imposed on Russia. And it can do so in a number of ways, from buying more gas and oil from Russia (with the assurance that it will squeeze it on price) to allowing it to use its international payments system (a sort of less powerful Swift) to providing it with what it now needs most, such as arms, although both Moscow and Beijing have strongly denied rumours that China is sending weapons to Russia.

Ultimately, China finds itself in a situation where it cannot turn its back on its "strategic partner", the country with which it shares a common vision of global governance, but also cannot sanction an invasion that goes against its principles and interests. China would have preferred Russia not to invade Ukraine.