Elections in Italy, everything is at stake for the centre-right
The last weekend of September sees the holding of new general elections (known as "political" elections), elections that should mark the beginning of the 20th Legislature in the history of the Italian Republic. Elections, moreover, which have the particularity that most of the electoral campaign, having been called on 21 July, is taking place partly during the summer holidays, so the reality is that the real campaign begins in the first week of September, which is when most of the voters called to the polls have returned to their daily lives. Hence, much of what we say below is tentative, pending what happens in the twenty-plus days that remain until polling day.
The first idea that seems clear is that it will be the centre-right, divided into three parties, that will win very clearly, something that should not surprise us: as a coalition, they were already the most voted in the previous elections (March 2018), and their level of support has only increased over the years against a centre-left that is going to suffer its umpteenth defeat since the 1996 elections (it was only able to win in 2006 and 2013, in the latter case by the slimmest of margins). What is striking is the change in the balance of power between the three parties that make up the centre-right: the party that has traditionally received the fewest votes (the Fratelli d'Italia of the Roman Meloni) is now the one that has by far the most votes, while the party of this coalition that received the most votes in the previous elections (Salvini's Lega) is now in second place and, in turn, Forza Italia, for years the dominant force on the centre-right, has dropped from second to third place compared to 2018, although it does give the impression that it will be decisive for there to be a "maggioranza" to govern.
The second idea is that the centre-left, essentially represented by the Democratic Party (PD), is resigned to a defeat that has been a long time coming. This is the first time since the party was founded (October 2007) that it is running without a secretary general or electoral candidate not elected in primaries: Veltroni was in 2008, Bersani in 2013 and Renzi in 2013, but the last secretary general to emerge from a primary (the governor of the Lazio region, Nicola Zingaretti) resigned in March 2021 and, since then, has not really had a visible leader. It is not surprising, in this regard, that in the absence of a leader, they have brought back into political life "Pippo" Civati, Matteo Renzi's rival in the December 2013 primaries, who temporarily left politics in 2018 to devote himself to the publishing world. Civati, like Renzi, Salvini and Meloni, belongs to the generation of the seventies, so the PD is probably looking to him to revitalise a left that is at a low ebb.
The third idea to bear in mind is that, in contrast to the traditional confrontation between centre-right and centre-left in all the general elections between 1996 and 2013, and also unlike what happened in 2018 (where the Five Star Movement, a party in a very ascendant line, turned the elections into a competition that was not bipolar, but tri-polar), the strength of each coalition is now key. Because the electoral law under which the elections will be held (the "Rosatellum bis", approved in October 2017), and under which the 2018 elections were held, has as its main peculiarity that it favours parties running in coalition over those running individually. However, there is a substantial difference with respect to the elections of four and a half years ago: after the "taglio" or reduction in the number of parliamentarians (which means that the Lower House will go from 630 seats to 400, and the Upper House from 315 to 200) was approved in a "referendum" (September 2020) by a large majority, what we are going to see is a renewed Parliament, in which at most half of the current parliamentarians will be able to revalidate their respective "seggi".
In this sense, the main novelty at the coalition level is what is known as "Il Terzo Polo", which involves the merger into a single candidacy of two parties that move between the centre and the centre-right: former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi's Italia Viva and former Minister Calenda's Azione (which has been joined by two former ministers belonging to Forza Italia, Carfagna and Gelmini). They have in their favour that the PD, having formed a coalition with communists and Greens, has clearly shifted to the left; and that in the centre-right the two main parties (Meloni's Fratelli d'Italia and Salvini's Lega) are clearly two right-wing parties (but not "ultra-right" as many like to say without wanting to see that these are two parties with a long democratic history), with the centre-right party Forza Italia of the several times "premier" Silvio Berlusconi being the party with the lowest level of support.
This "Terzo Polo", which is characterised not only by having one of the longest-serving prime ministers (Matteo Renzi, who governed for 1,020 days between 2014 and 2016), but also by having one of the longest-ruling governments in the world (Matteo Renzi, who governed for 1,020 days between 2014 and 2016). 020 days between 2014 and 2016, being only surpassed by two Executives presided by Berlusconi and one by Bettino Craxi), but for having a large roster of former ministers (Calenda, Carfagna, Gelmini, Bellanova, Bonetti and Boschi) who also belong overwhelmingly to the generation born in the seventies, tries to represent what is known as the "Draghi agenda", a document of about 1. 200 pages approved by the EU institutions in April 2021, when the then "premier" Mario Draghi presented it and which assumes that, in exchange for a broad programme of reforms (one of which, that of the justice system, has already been fulfilled), the country would receive a very large sum of money from the EU.
And this is one of the key issues in these elections: will the saying "he who brings down a government pays for it at the ballot box" come true (we are referring to Cinque Stelle, Lega and Forza Italia, the three parties that abandoned the Draghi government in the third week of July and caused the abrupt end of the legislature). Because what the representatives of the "Terzo Polo" claim as a differential element against the centre-right (and they also say this in relation to the PD, but this is not true because this party also supported Draghi until his fall) is that they voted "fiducia" ("trust") to the Draghi government at all times from the moment he took office (February 2021) until his fall seventeen months later. What is certain is that, given the fact that Draghi wanted to stay out of the electoral competition, the leaders of "Il Terzo Polo" guarantee that, if they pass the "sbarramento" or threshold to enter Parliament (at 3% for individual parties and 10% for coalitions), they will do everything in their power to ensure that the party will be able to win the elections, they will do everything in their power to ensure the return of a Draghi who, it should be remembered, left the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (he is still in charge, but only for the management of "current" affairs) with a very high level of popularity: A few days ago, for example, he was received with a thunderous ovation at the "meeting" in Rimini.
Outside these three coalitions is a Five Star Movement that has been left without its main "heavyweights" (Bonafede, D'Inca, Fico, Taverna, Tonninelli, etc.) as it is statutorily unable to run for a third consecutive legislature. Of course, few will miss them: they are the main "exponents" of what could be called the "party-fiasco" of the 19th Legislature. The truth is that, as an individual party, and according to all the polls currently being released, it is assured of entering Parliament, although it seems that it will not be able to avoid becoming a residual party.
Others whose entry is assured, because they concentrate their vote in a single region (Trentino Alto-Adige) are the so-called "South Tyrol People's Party", which belongs to the area that was occupied by the Austro-Hungarian Empire until the end of World War I. Finally, with more difficulties to overcome the "sbarramento" is the Italexit party of the senator and former member of Cinque Stelle Paragone, which seems to do so through the "sbarramento". Finally, the Italexit party of the senator and former Cinque Stelle member Paragone, which, if it enters parliament, seems likely to do so by the slimmest of margins, is having more difficulty in overcoming the "sbarramento".
The game is still wide open. It should be borne in mind that, with a population that is more than fed up with its political class and logically much more concerned about the extraordinary rise in the cost of living that has taken place in recent months, the number of undecided voters is still very high and a "record" abstention rate is also expected. On the other hand, Salvini, at the moment some twelve points behind his rival Meloni, has not yet said his last word: he governs twelve regions, a multitude of local councils and has more than 200 members of parliament, compared with just 60 in Roman politics, which means that, unlike Roman politics, his party can campaign in many more parts of the country. The increasingly palpable reality is that Meloni may achieve the feat of becoming the first woman president of the Council of Ministers after 32 previous all-male presidents in the 77 years of the Italian Republic, but it will also be true that Salvini, as well as Berlusconi, will greatly condition her government's actions, since Fratelli d'Italia narrowly exceeds half of the votes needed to take control of the new Executive that will emerge from the ballot box.
As we say, the only thing that is really clear is that, since Mario Monti became prime minister (November 2011), we will have the first centre-right government, and also (something important from the point of view of "democratic hygiene"), a "premier" who came out of the ballot box after up to six prime ministers not elected by the voters called to the polls. From this point on, it seems that Meloni will win, because for the moment he is managing his advantage intelligently. But he must also remember that Salvini is a more than fearsome rival, and that he will not digest, just like that, being left without being president of the Council of Ministers after several years (in essence, from September 2018 to June 2021) leading all the polls of voting intentions. Let time decide who becomes the transalpine voters' favourite candidate.
Pablo Martín de Santa Olalla Saludes is the author of the book "Historia de la Italia republicana, 1946-2021" (Madrid, Sílex Ediciones, 2021).