Opinion

Europe, polarisation and liberal democracy

photo_camera Europa, polarización y democracia liberal Nuria González Campañá Se ha convertido ya en un lugar común afirmar que uno de los principales problemas a los que se enfrenta Europa es el deterioro o la erosión democrática en algunos Estados miembros. Sin duda, este retroceso no es exclusivo de países europeos, pero conviene que en estas líneas nos centremos en Europa. Al hablar de erosión democrática, debemos concretar a qué nos referimos, porque la democracia entendida simplemente como el gobierno del pue

It has become commonplace to say that one of the main problems facing Europe is the deterioration or erosion of democracy in some member states. This backsliding is certainly not exclusive to European countries, but it is appropriate here to focus on Europe. 

When we speak of democratic erosion, we must be specific about what we are referring to, because democracy understood simply as the rule of the people is still an ascendant value with predicament. It is liberal or constitutional democracy, where the majoritarian principle does not override all other considerations, that is suffering setbacks. To assume that democracy is simply the rule of the majority is a very poor conception of democracy, and it is also a conception that is alien to the peace-making and consensus-building efforts of post-war European constitutionalism. The democracy we enjoy is tempered by respect for minorities, pluralism, a free media, transparency in the actions of the public authorities and, above all, their subjection to the law and the control of independent courts. As the European Commission has insisted on several occasions, there is no democracy without the rule of law. Or, at least, there is no constitutional democracy. 

We know that democracies can die after coups d'état, but we also know that there are more subtle forms of degradation. When independent judges are considered enemies of the people, when disobedience is encouraged by those in power and the pro-power media, or when political opponents are denied the legitimacy to express themselves freely, our democracies are perverted. 

It is not trivial for the future of European integration to question whether the EU can survive if the erosion of democracy in its member states continues. It is therefore imperative to address the strengthening of liberal democracies in member states. Levitsky and Ziblatt have argued that extreme political polarisation is one of the main causes of this erosion. While the population may support liberal democracy, we are told that in highly polarised countries, where there is anger and rage, voters are willing to sacrifice certain liberal principles for partisan interests. Milan W. Svolik, referring, among others, to Hungary, explains how the greater the political polarisation, the easier it is for illiberal leaders to exploit these divisions, since their supporters will accept (albeit unconvincingly) democratic regressions in exchange for preventing the opposition from coming to power and implementing their own policies. Different studies show how polarisation has increased in practically all European countries over the last two decades, except in France, where it was already very high and remains at the same coordinates. The illiberal temptation is not only present in Hungary and Poland, but threatens many European countries. 

The reasons for the rejection of liberal postulates cannot be found exclusively in material or inequality issues, but rather in a cultural, value or spiritual crisis. For years it was thought that the liberal triad, the Council of Europe's principles of respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, were sufficient to unite a society. Today we know that this is not the case. The political liberalism that has prevailed in many European countries has lacked substantive content, and this has caused disquiet in broad sections of our societies. As David Goodhart explains, the lack of confidence in the institutions that represent this cosmopolitan elite stems not only from a sense of material loss, but also from cultural anxiety. Krastev and Goodhart have pointed out that the main dividing lines in Europe are no longer class, but cultural aspects of identity, the famous 'anywheres' versus 'somewheres'. The spirit of modern societies ("live and let live") is not enough to sustain our communities, because it does not satisfy many people, although the dominance of this discourse in the public space might lead us to believe otherwise. 

It is precisely illiberal political forces that remind Europeans of the importance of displaced values such as patriotism, national identity or religion. Of course, these values can become exclusionary, but they do not have to be. As Professor Weiler reminds us, there is also a noble and republican tradition that allows the individual to feel that he or she is a partner in the state without falling into nationalist or authoritarian temptations.

If liberal democracies are to prevail, Krastev believes we must counter illiberal voices by taking on some of the traditional values to which many voters remain attached. They should at least enjoy more space in public discourse. Years ago Jonathan Haidt warned of the political danger of labelling any concern about multiculturalism or immigration as racism or xenophobia. When the fears and anxieties of part of the population are ignored or ridiculed, we should not be surprised by the rise of the only political parties that pay attention to them. We must strive to practise within our own communities the European values of which we are so proud: tolerance, openness and pluralism. For as Ivan Krastev says, more important than the secret ballot is the freedom to express your ideas publicly, the freedom to be seen and to express how you feel. Perhaps the time has come for Europeans to take this seriously. 

 
Núria González Campañá, Postdoctoral Researcher in European Constitutional Law, University of Barcelona 
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