The European Union instruments for the externalization of irregular migration management since 2016
Following the events of 2016, the European Union identified shortcomings in its internal mechanisms for regulating migration from outside its borders. Thus, since 2016, the international organisation has strengthened its external instruments to combat irregular migration. Thus, border control in third states, the Agreement with Turkey and the Migration Partnership Framework became particularly important. These can be seen to respond to different geo-strategies that the EU employs externally in order to externalise the management of irregular migration and prevent it from reaching its borders.
The massive arrivals of migrants in 2016 to the European Union (referred to in this paper as the EU) from the Middle East and North Africa exposed the weaknesses of the international organisation's internal migration mechanisms at the time. Both the Dublin Convention and the Common European Asylum System were greatly affected by these developments. Faced with this situation, the EU had to look for other ways to cover the shortcomings of its internal migration policy. The solution came in the form of strengthening the external instruments that the EU had at its disposal to fight irregular migration1.
This paper argues that since 2016 the EU's migration management has been based on external action instruments conceptualised in the model of concentric circles of the exercise of power rather than on the internal legal order. In this sense, the main research question of the article is what are the main instruments that the European Union has used for the management of irregular migration since 2016.
There are different strategies that the European Union applies to its external action. A broad consensus2 considers that the European strategy towards the external management of migration can be defined as concentric circles. Specifically, Papageorigiou3 explains that the EU's external action in this area is based on a model of concentric circles with four dimensions. The inner and first circle would be composed of the Schengen countries; the second circle would be filled by the associated states and Mediterranean member states; the third circle by Turkey and North African countries; and the fourth and last circle by the Middle East region, China and sub-Saharan Africa. The EU pays particular attention to the third and fourth circles. In the third circle, actions focus on transit controls while the fourth circle would be based on eliminating the motivations and interests for making the decision to migrate.
Similarly, Christopher Browning and Pertti Joenniemi4 explain European external action on the basis of different models of geopolitics. Among them are three models of geopolitics: Westphalian, imperial and neo-medieval European geopolitics. While the Westphalian model consists of power being held at the centre and applied to the frontier, and the neo-medieval model focuses on a more dispersed, regionalised and multi-centred view of power, the European imperial model is comparable to the representation of concentric circles. In the imperial model, power is located at the centre and extends outwards to varying degrees.
Furthermore, these two authors5 show, with the help of William Walters' framework, that there are different geopolitical strategies developed by the EU to manage the externalisation of irregular migration to third countries. The first geo-strategy is the "networked (non)border", which is linked to the idea of a borderless world and globalisation studies. In this type of strategy, spatial borders become blurred and are not as important. Moreover, this geo-strategy does not divide the inside and outside of the border into an us and them dichotomy, but focuses on sharing responsibility with the outside. The second geo-strategy is that of "marches". It is understood as a zone that separates different entities, as the border zone between the inside and outside of the EU is perceived as a buffer zone. The territory that constitutes this buffer zone is perceived as one that provides security and separates the interior from the border characterised by chaos and disorder on the outside. The third strategy is called limes and envisages a hierarchical order between the inside and the outside of the EU border establishing asymmetrical relations due to the perception of unequal power. The last geo-strategy is called 'colonial frontier', which conceives of the border as dynamic and as an area of interaction and violence, but also as an area in which a peace-making mission can be carried out. Central to this strategy is the idea that the inside of the frontier is willing to transform the outside with its own preferences. A gradual incorporation of the outside into the inside is intended when these preferences of the inside are fulfilled. The difference between limes and this strategy is that the former does not see borders as dynamic and does not seek to incorporate the outside into the inside.
This article will argue that the EU has pursued a model of imperial geopolitics or concentric circles fuelled by the three main instruments it has implemented since 2016. Furthermore, while the colonial border geo-strategy can be seen in the EU's accession partnerships, the paper will explain what other Walter's geo-strategies are useful to understand the EU's behaviour within the imperial model since 2016. The common external border of the European Union established by the Schengen area will be taken to interpret these geo-strategies with the "inside" of the border being the European member states and the "outside" being the rest.
Externalisation of border control is one of the key instruments at the EU's disposal to manage irregular migration arriving at its external borders. The term is defined as "the set of processes by which European actors and member states complement migration control policies across their territorial borders with initiatives that carry out migration control extraterritorially and through other countries and bodies instead of their own".6 Externalisation of European border control is part of the legitimisation that the EU has gained from the externalisation of its external borders.
The externalisation of European border control is part of the legitimisation of externalising measures by public opinion in member states because the Western population and institutions already have a built-in securitising behaviour within their collective imagination.7 Therefore, the externalisation of European border control is part of the legitimisation of externalising measures by public opinion in member states. The externalisation of European border control is therefore not widely opposed and builds on the securitisation sentiment that has been growing over the years in Western states. Senior European institutions have frequently announced that one of their main priorities is to protect external borders against irregular migration in order to achieve internal security.8 The EU has two different tracks on the issue of border control.
The EU has two different approaches to the exercise of border control in third states: the holding of forums for mutual exchange (summits or conferences) and the further expansion of its borders to third countries by removing the threat of irregular migration.
To promote border control in third countries, the EU - using its soft power influence - gets to share its expertise by working on the ground. Inken Bartels9 explains that this dissemination and production of knowledge that the international organisation provides to third countries is commonly perceived as objective and apolitical. However, far from this view, he argues that the fora that the EU creates for mutual exchange with third countries "allow them to integrate their particular knowledge on how to manage migration"10 He argues that the European organisation uses its expertise in the field of migration management as a tool for the exchange of knowledge between the EU and third countries. He argues that the European organisation uses its symbolic power to externalise migration policies through this dissemination of knowledge. Similarly, Aysen Üstübici11 argues that the EU tries to force its neighbours to fight irregular migration flows on its side. Thus, the different European discourses deployed in different fora of mutual exchange are shaping the direction of third countries' policies by adapting them to similar views to fight irregular migration together.
In contrast to this view that positions a hierarchical relationship between the EU and its neighbours, Sandra Lavenex12 proposes a different perspective, that of horizontal governance. This governance perspective perceives EU neighbourhood relations as a gradual process of "formal and informal horizontal institutionalisation "13 . Moreover, what this author explains is that from this perspective the EU's influence is not hierarchical and not motivated by leadership of third countries, but rather an attempt to create with them a common normative structure with the particularity of including them in the process.
However, putting both Lavenex's and Bartels' views together, although they have different ways of perceiving the EU's motivations for external border control, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive but complementary. It may be true that the EU has on many occasions extended its influence in a non-hierarchical manner, but this does not mean that it has not tried to introduce its European and Western perspective into migration policies in third countries. It can therefore be argued that the EU has cleverly played its soft power.
Be that as it may, taking into account the concentric circles model of the exercise of power, European management of border control in third countries is carried out through a combination of the limes strategy and the "marches" strategy: it wants to consolidate its
The EU wants to consolidate its "empire" within the Schengen area while at the same time pushing the threat - migration - to other, more remote borders by having a buffer zone in the middle that functions as a security element.
Acuerdo Turquía-UE
Prior to the 2016 irregular migration crisis, the EU already had several instruments with which it could address migration externally. These include the Global Approach to Migration (GAM) of 2005 or the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) of 2011. The latter was based on several policy areas such as development cooperation, migration and asylum or aid and neighbourhood policy. However, the fact that it touched on several areas led to fragmentation and thus ineffectiveness. In 2015, the Migration Agenda was launched with a focus on a security approach. It affirmed the need to focus on the causes of migration, border reinforcement and readmission agreements. That same year, at the Valletta Summit, the EU admitted its failure on migration to the heads of state and government of several African countries and made it clear that the EU must adopt new measures to address the crisis.
In this vein, one of the first direct steps in the externalisation of irregular migration was the new declaration signed with Turkey14 . Although the EU had previous agreements with Turkey and their relationship goes back some time, the most recent one is the turning point in the EU's management of irregular migration, as they decided to act directly abroad. On 20 March 2016, the Agreement entered into force with the aim of creating 'a system capable of stopping the flow of migration before it reaches the EU'15 on the Greek side. As Üstübici16 states, the Agreement is understood as the 'continuation of the externalisation of EU migration and border policies'.
As mentioned above, the Agreement aimed to limit the number of irregular migrants as well as asylum seekers entering European soil. The declaration included, as Kyilah Terry17 explains, that "irregular migrants attempting to enter Greece would be returned to Turkey, and Ankara would take measures to prevent the opening of new migration routes. In return, the EU agreed to resettle Syrian refugees from Turkey on an individual basis, ease visa restrictions for Turkish citizens, pay 6 billion euros in aid to Turkey for Syrian migrant communities, update the customs union and revive stalled talks on Turkey's EU membership". Thus, the agreement was intended to reduce the pressure of irregular migration to reach the EU.
The Turkey-EU Agreement is again part of the imperial model. With this agreement, the EU makes it clear that it sees the outside world as a source of instability and insecurity from which it has to protect itself by securing its own borders. In addition, the agreement between these two actors is, from the EU's perspective, posited as a geo-strategy of 'the marches' that portrays Turkey as the buffer zone as the outside world is perceived as chaotic and immersed in instability, as it was in some ways in the aftermath of the Arab Spring or the Syrian civil war.
If the Turkey-EU Deal was an Eastern oriented policy, the Migration Partnership Framework (MPF) has a more Southern perspective focusing its priorities on the African continent. As the European Commission explained in 2016, this instrument is included in the development and neighbourhood policy tools of the EU and ‘should reinforce local capacity building, including for border control, asylum, counter smuggling and reintegration efforts’ 18. In addition, the Commission also highlighted that the European Union member states and the third countries should work together to order irregular migratory flows.
The MPF has two aims. On the short term, saving lives in the Mediterranean was key as well as increase the returns of irregular migration to their countries of origin and transit. On the long term, the objective was to address the causes of irregular migration as well as improving the opportunities on countries of origin. Special attention was made to five countries due to their importance as countries of origin and transit: Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Senegal. The European Union helps to reduce the flows by supporting these countries in three main areas: strengthening borders, expanding the proportion of unauthorised migrants who are returned and addressing the main causes of migration19. By doing so, the European Union is attaching the collaboration and cooperation of these countries to conditionalities such as funds and investments. Therefore, one of the problems of the MPF is that while it considers the perspective of the European Union and its member states, it doesn’t pay too much attention to the interests of third countries. Therefore, not all the countries involved in this Framework are keen to satisfy the conditions of the European Union and work along with it20.
The European Union instruments for the externalization of irregular migration management since 2016 María Torondel Lara Opinion Paper 115/2021 9 borders externalizing irregular migration management far from its territory. Furthermore, the MPF is also part of the concentric circles model of use of power. However, if the Turkey-EU Deal had a march geostrategy in which Turkey was seen as a buffer zone, the MPF is driven by a limes’ geostrategic motivation. The MPF has, from the European point of view, nuances of superiority towards third states seen in the conditionality dynamics. Moreover, the MPF is a direct attempt to contain and deter irregular migration securitizing its own borders in with the aim of preserving its achieved security, just as the limes geostrategy pursues
Conclusion
Although there are other instruments that could have been discussed in the frame of the externalization of irregular migration management such as the European Neighbourhood Policy or the readmission agreements, this paper studies the instruments that appeared and became relevant after the detection of the flaws of the European internal migratory policy in 2016. The main thesis was that, since that year, the European Union turned its attention to cope with irregular migration outside its borders pursuing the securitization of its own. In the light of the arguments explained in the paper, this thesis is fulfilled in practise.
Answering to the main research question —which instruments does the European Union apply for the externalization of the irregular migration management since 2016?— is of particular importance the management of border control in third countries, the EU-Turkey Deal, and the Migration Partnership Framework. From a critical point of view, these instruments have contributed to consolidate the European migration policy which is characterized by the Imperial or the concentric circles model of exercising power where the march and limes geostrategies have been equally helpful.
As a final remark, I want to stress the two faces of the externalization of irregular migration management. One of them is explained in this paper. It is focused on a critical perspective of this issue centring the attention in the self-interest motivation that the European Union towards the external action to other countries with the aim of securitizing its own territory. In this way, the European Union is exercising its role of normative power with selfish interest. However, on the other hand, the positive point of view, although less popular should be the fact that in the attempt of exercising its normative power to the third countries it could achieve the defence of human rights, fight against corruption or against authoritarian political systems in those territories.
Be as it may, the European Union as an international actor in the global system is, from a realist point of view, working for achieving better conditions inside its borders while securitizing them to surviv
1 TAGALIAPIETRA, Alberto. “The European Migration Crisis: A Pendulum between the Internal and External Dimensions”, Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), 2019, p. 2. Acceso el 10 de mayo de 2021. Disponible en : https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep19673.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A496c1c7059a4a30ab33d9bc4a26 6de95.
2 PAPAGEORGIOU, Vasilis. “The Externalization of European Borders”, Center for International Strategic Analysis, Research Paper No. 23, 2019. Acceso el 9 de mayo de 2021. Disponible en: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324780431_The_Externalization_of_European_Borders y BROWNING, Christopher and JOENNEIEMI, Pertti. “Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood Policy”, European Journal of International Relations, 14(3), 2008, pp. 519-551. Acceso el 9 de mayo de 2021. Disponible en : https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1354066108092311?journalCode=ejta.
3 PAPAGEORGIOU. op. cit., 2018; pp. 11-12.
4 BROWNING y JOENNEIEMI. op. cit., 2008; pp. 522-526.
5 Idem pp.526-530
6 MORENO-LAX, Violeta and LEMBERG-PEDERSEN, Martin. “Border-induced displacement: the ethical and legal implications of distance-creation through externalization”, Questions of International Law, Zoom- in 56, 2019, p. 5. Acceso el 9 de mayo de 2021. Disponible en: http://www.qil-qdi.org/wp-
7 PAPAGEORGIOU. op. cit., 2018; p. 5.
8 ÜSTÜBICI, Aysen and IÇDUYGU, Ahmet. “Border closures and the externalization of immigration controls in the Mediterranean: a comparative analysis of Morocco and Turkey”, New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 00, 2018, p. 6. Acceso el 9 de mayo de 2021. Disponible en: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329159896_Border_closures_and_the_externalization_of_immi gration_controls_in_the_Mediterranean_A_comparative_analysis_of_Morocco_and_Turkey.
9 BARTELS, Inken. “Practices and Power of Knowledge Dissemination. International Organizations in the Externalization of Migration Management in Morocco and Tunisia”, Movements Journal, vol. 4, Issue 1/2018, 2018, p. 48. Acceso el 9 de mayo de 2021. Disponible en: https://movements- journal.org/issues/06.wissen/03.bartels--practices-and-power-of-knowledge-dissemination-international- organizations-in-the-externalization-of-migration-management-in-morocco-and-tunisia.pdf.
10 Idem.
11 Ustubici, op cit, 2018, p7
12 LAVENEX, Sandra. “A governance perspective on the European neighbourhood policy: integration beyond conditionality?”, Journal of European Public Policy, 15:6, September 2008, pp. 938-955. Acceso el 9 de mayo de 2021. Disponible en: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/248990500_A_Governance_Perspective_on_the_European_Ne ighbourhood_Policy_Integration_beyond_Conditionality.
13 Idem p.939
14 TAGALIAPIETRA. op. cit. 2019; p.7.
15 Idem.
16 ÜSTÜBICI, op. cit., 2018; p. 20.
17 TERRY, Kyilah (2021). “The EU-Turkey Deal, Five Years On: A Frayed and Controversial but Enduring Blueprint”, Migration Policy Institute, 2021. Acceso el 10 de mayo de 2021. Disponible en: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/eu-turkey-deal-five-years-on.
18 “Communication from the Commission on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration”, European Commission, 2016. Acceso el 10 de mayo de 2021. Disponible en: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016DC0385
19 TAGALIAPIETRA. op. cit. 2019; p. 12.
20 Idem.