Humanitarian crisis, jihadism and rumours of a coup d'état: the crisis in Burkina Faso

The situation in this West African country is worrying the entire international community because of its rapidly deteriorating situation. Burkina Faso, situated in the south of Mali and west of Niger, has been affected by the spread of jihadism from neighbouring countries. Entering through the north of Burkina Faso in 2015, jihadists have progressively established themselves in the country and occupy, to a greater or lesser extent, all regions of Burkina Faso except the Plateau Central and the region where the capital, Ouagadougou, is located. 

The advance of jihadism has been similar to that of Mali and Niger. Jihadist groups exploit inter-community tensions to recruit followers. The region's endogamous group, Ansaraoul Islam, linked to al-Qaeda's JNIM jihadist coalition, has taken advantage of the presumed marginalisation of the nomadic Peul community in the north of the country to recruit followers. Its leader, Ibrahim Mallam Dicko, an imam in the region, had a close relationship with the leader of the Katiba Macina jihadist group in central Mali, Amadou Koufa, who was also a Koranic scholar. 

In response to the spread of terrorism, other communities have reacted by creating self-defence militias whose aim, at first, was to defend populations from the jihadist threat, but soon became an ethno-communal armed group that blamed and punished the Peul community for the radicalisation of some of its individuals. This is the case of the Mossi militia Koglwéogo, which has carried out massacres among the Peul community, such as in Yirgou in 2019, where 48 Peul civilians lost their lives. This situation is similar to what happened in Mali with the Dons militias, with episodes such as the one in Ogossagou, in central Mali, where more than 160 Peul lost their lives in 2019. All these incidents have transformed the communities, leading to a level of inter-communal violence never before seen in Burkina Faso and a cycle of retaliation between the Peul (whether jihadists or not) who take revenge for incidents against them and, for example, the Mossis and their militias who fight back. This has been the breeding ground in which jihadism has been able to spread most rapidly.

Another factor that has contributed to the expansion has been the attitude of the state and its armed forces, committing abuses against civilians of the Peul community because they are considered radicalised. According to a local source, in Magodara commune, Peul civilians have been killed by the armed forces without any subsequent investigation. In a village in Niangoloko commune similar incidents have occurred in which seven civilians from the Peul community lost their lives, as well as in the south-west where rapes and killings of Sidibe Peuls have also occurred. Arrests without trial are common in Banfora. In this respect, Burkina Faso has followed in the footsteps of Mali, which had a similar attitude in the beginning, even supporting self-defence militias to wage war on jihadism where they could not reach. In Mali, however, when militias began indiscriminately attacking civilians, the state changed its tune. In Burkina Faso, the state took a different tack by recruiting an army of volunteers (the volunteers of the defence for the homeland) in order to extend the capacities of the limited army. These volunteers came from the regions most affected by jihadism, such as the North and the Sahel, and were briefly trained by Burkinabe officers. In some cases they were provided with weapons, but today these militia groups are poorly trained and armed. This initiative has further incited violence in the regions, adding another actor to the fragile crisis.

The situation has continued to worsen in recent years with very limited state military responses. According to the New Humanitarian newspaper, the Burkina Faso government struck a secret deal in November 2020 with the jihadists so that national elections could be held in relative peace. This temporary agreement ended earlier this year when violence flared up again in force, continuing to spread southwards. Community leaders have decided to take the initiative in the face of the state's lack of response and negotiate with local jihadist leaders, some of whom were from the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland, according to the newspaper's article on negotiations with jihadists in Burkina Faso published in November this year. These complex dialogues are bearing partial fruit, providing some peace in the most violence-ridden regions controlled by jihadist groups, such as the Sahel region, the North and the East, in exchange for a strict application of Sharia law. The aim of these meetings is not only to end the blockades that jihadist groups impose on jihadist-controlled localities, but also to understand what the jihadists' political objectives are, how to get them to allow displaced people to return to their cities and to end cycles of violence. According to ACLED, more than 400 people have been killed in jihadist attacks in the past seven months. Local negotiations with jihadists have also been going on for some time in Mali. Examples include the Niono Agreement between the Dons and jihadists. These negotiations in Burkina Faso are taking place without state involvement, so communities are not having any guidance on what they can offer to the mujahideen who want to demobilise or even to the jihadist groups themselves. Communities that are signing agreements, as in the case of Nassoumbou, do so without much choice or bargaining power, but at least they get the killings to stop by accepting the strict rules imposed.

Although the north remains the hardest hit area, the jihadist threat has been expanding to practically reach the borders of Togo and Benin and other West African coastal states, where several border attacks occurred this November, including the first on Beninese territory. As in Mali and Niger, the military response is producing very limited results. Last month, 50 gendarmes were killed in Inata, northern Burkina Faso, the largest attack on the country's armed forces. The state's strategy of making military units smaller and spreading them across the country is being criticised by some leaders of the security forces. According to sources consulted by the newspaper Jeune Afrique, this strategy makes the forces an easy target for jihadist groups. Moreover, they complain about the lack of equipment and even basic provisions, with soldiers reportedly having to hunt for food to survive. This situation is reminiscent of what happened in Mali in 2012, when the Malian military, faced with a lack of support to fight jihadism and the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali, staged a coup d'état. Inspired by neighbouring Guinea and Mali, where three military coups have taken place in two years, there are rumours that some young military officers are considering staging a coup d'état.

In addition to the political, social and security crisis, Burkina Faso faces a serious humanitarian crisis. More than 1.4 million internally displaced people (IDPs) have been counted, although organisations know that the figure is higher due to problems with the registration of IDPs who do not have documentation. According to a source in an international NGO present in the region, the state's attitude to the crisis is one of denial and accusing NGOs of manipulation. The NGO Norwegian Refugee Council was forced to suspend its activities for a month following a communiqué it issued last September alerting the international community to the seriousness of the ongoing crisis. There was a similar reaction to Oxfam's report highlighting sexual abuse in IDP camps. Burkina Faso's Ministry of Humanitarian Action is opposing any such publication condemning the mismanagement of the humanitarian crisis. The government is now requiring permission from journalists and humanitarians who want to visit IDP camps, permission which is often denied or access to certain areas restricted. 

The worrying situation in Burkina Faso is the culmination of a process that began in 2015. Because of the crisis in Mali, the international community has put less focus on this crisis, which is now beginning to occupy the attention of the media, researchers and government and international programme managers. Unfortunately, the situation has deteriorated so much that the response has come too late. The international community's only hope is to control the advance of jihadism towards the countries of the Gulf of Guinea. The experience in Mali should serve as an example to international organisations and local and national governments of the kind of policies that work best and those that should not be pursued, one of which is the use of militias without any control or knowledge of humanitarian law, and another of which is the strong military strategy that has led to abuses and hundreds of civilian and military deaths.