An impossible victory

The conflict has been going on for almost eight months now and its evolution has come as a surprise to all and sundry. What's more, I would go so far as to say that neither of the two sides, nor those who took Ukraine's side with weapons and all kinds of means, had ever envisaged a scenario like the current one. A scenario that, surprisingly enough, seems to have become dangerously too favourable for the invaded country.

It is not our intention to go through everything that has happened since February, as much has been written about it and much more will be written in the coming years.
But by way of summary we can say that, despite the death, destruction and commotion caused, the Russian army has demonstrated capabilities in all areas (tactical, technical, etc.) far below what might have been expected. This begs the first question: was this situation really unknown to the military and political leadership? Or did they know about it, but did not take the necessary measures to remedy the situation?

Whether one assumption or the other is correct, the reality is that for years Russia has been able to sell the exact opposite, taking for granted the fearsome capabilities of an army that was supposed to be ready to take on NATO.

To the above statement, a second, as obvious as the first, should be added: The Ukrainian army, while surprisingly strong and able to adapt to a situation of clear inferiority on all fronts, owes the success of its resistance, and especially its recent offensive actions on two fronts, to a large extent to the massive international assistance it is receiving. Not only in the form of weapons, but also in humanitarian, economic and other forms of aid. However, it should be noted that even before Western aid began to arrive in appreciable quantities, the Ukrainian armed forces were able to stand up to the invaders and stop them by inflicting enormous casualties and damage.

At this point in the conflict, we can identify two factors that undoubtedly equal or, rather, affect both sides equally: one is fatigue. Eight months of war is an enormous drain, not only physically and psychologically on the combatants, but also on the life of the country. The other is the enormous number of casualties. This figure, although it is only an estimate, and for this reason we will not give a specific figure, is one of the best kept secrets by both countries, one doing so to maintain the morale of its own and the other to hide the disaster of the operation. But there is no doubt that on both sides it can be described as tremendous.

Given the title of this article: "An Impossible Victory", some may wonder what the basis for this statement is.

To do so, we must first try to define what each side understands by a victory. 

For Russia, according to the statements of its leaders, and despite the fact that over time it has been correcting its aspirations and, we could say, lowering its expectations, we can consider that a victory would be determined by achieving total control of the oblasts of Lughansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zapoiriya. In fact, leaving aside other considerations, according to their legal framework, after the referendums held just over a month ago, these four regions have become part of the Russian Federation. To this Russian concept of victory we can add other less tangible elements that at a given moment may be "sellable" to public opinion, such as "denazification", now transformed into "de-Nazification", but that is just a garnish. It is true that in the early days of the invasion victory included the imposition of a puppet government in Ukraine, but that became an impossibility the very moment Zelensky refused to be evacuated.

On the Ukrainian side the vision of a victory encompasses not only the recovery of what Russia has gained since February this year, but the expulsion of Russia from all territory conquered during the 2014 conflict and from the Crimean peninsula.

Any outside and minimally fair-minded observer analysing the situation and its evolution will come to the conclusion that neither of the two desired end states is possible.

What is it that leads us to make this assertion?

On the Russian side, Russia's military shortcomings are evident, as is its inability to conduct joint and complex operations. The material shortcomings of its forces are confirmed by the use of increasingly outdated equipment, the need to resort to Belarus to train new personnel, the use of anti-aircraft missiles against ground targets, the absence of its air force, unable to achieve air superiority, and so on. And to top it all off, mention should be made of the lack of sufficient numbers and poor quality of ISR means and the need to turn to third countries such as Iran to acquire material that in theory Russia should be able to manufacture in terms of technology and industrial capacity without any problem.

A separate chapter concerns personnel. The recent mobilisation of 300,000 men, as well as the increasing use of Wagner mercenaries and reports of forced conscription of prisoners are clear indicators not only of the enormous number of casualties Russia has suffered but also of the enormous difficulty of finding replacements for those casualties.

And this is a very important aspect where we can dare to say that Putin has played his last card. The aforementioned forced conscription of prisoners only confirms this. A second mobilisation is already impossible and unfeasible, both in terms of the message it would send about the future of operations and the social impact it would have. Russian society would not accept such a move and the disturbances caused during the previous one would multiply exponentially with unforeseeable consequences.

Against Russia, on the Ukrainian side, the factors preventing a victory by their standards are different. Their fight, at least at the current level, depends one hundred percent on external assistance. Without it, Ukraine would undoubtedly continue to fight, but its resistance would have to take the form of an insurgency, incapable of carrying out large-scale operations.

Similarly, the suffering of the civilian population is largely alleviated by external economic and humanitarian aid. 

This dependence greatly conditions Kiev's decision-making capacity, for if decisions are taken or actions are taken that go beyond what could be considered tolerable or that could provoke an undesirable and uncontrollable escalation of the conflict, support would certainly cease, if not entirely then significantly.

It is obvious that the message the Ukrainian government must send to its fellow citizens is the one they are sending: Ukraine will not cease its struggle until it recovers everything it has lost, including the Donbas and the Crimean peninsula. But it is also clear that they are aware that even if this were militarily possible, which it is not today with the aid they have received, it would hardly be tolerated by those who are now their greatest allies and supporters.

Both the US and the EU countries that are sending material to Ukraine have reiterated on numerous occasions, in the face of Kiev's excessive demands, that Ukraine will receive the aid deemed necessary at any given moment. And that is why they have been very cautious about sending heavy equipment such as battle tanks, as well as fighters and even ground-to-ground missiles such as ATACMS.

All in all, the outlook is very difficult for both sides. 

Knowing that they will not be able to achieve the desired victory offered to their respective peoples, both Moscow and Kiev must begin to work out what their minimum acceptable levels will be and how they will sell this final situation to their populations.

Because if there is one thing that is indisputable, it is the fact that both Russians and Ukrainians, the day after the end of hostilities, will ask their governments for explanations of what has happened, what has been achieved and what has been lost. And both sides of the border will ask themselves whether this hypothetical final situation was worth all the effort and suffering.

Ironically, it could be said that both governments are in a sense fighting for their political survival.

It must be said at this point that it is on the Russian side that they will have the hardest time convincing their society of the need for this sad and ominous "adventure". For whatever happens, the goal of moving away from NATO's borders has not only not been achieved, it has been increased. Ukraine has been removed forever from the Russian sphere of influence, its post-war development will be sponsored by the entire Western bloc, and its armed forces will evolve to the best of the country's capabilities to ensure that no one else has similar intentions on its territory. On top of that, there will be the international isolation, the long-term continuation of sanctions and the harsh reality of the number of casualties to be gained... it is not yet clear what.

On the Ukrainian side, it will not be easy for the current government to "sell" the more than likely loss of territory, or at least the non-recovery of Crimea and certainly of the territories occupied in 2014. At best we can predict a return to the pre-February borders. Convincing its population to stop the war at that point will be difficult. As will then be justifying the enormous sacrifice in human lives and the destruction of much of the country's critical infrastructure in order to simply return to square one. Although in this case the reaction to a full-scale invasion will help. However, it is more than likely that in this scenario President Zelensky will lose power.

So, if neither of the contenders can achieve what they publicly state are their goals, what might the final scenario be?

To propose a scenario at this stage is daring or at least complicated, as there are numerous external and entirely new factors that may open up hitherto unexplored avenues. We are obviously referring to the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, for example.

Notwithstanding the above, and considering that it is the task of any analyst to make such an approach and not just to scrutinise the facts that have already happened, we can put forward an option that under normal conditions will not be far from reality. And one way or another, time will give or take away reasons.

Starting from the premise, as we have stated, that a victory is impossible for both Russia and Ukraine, and taking as elements of judgement: the exhaustion of both countries, the economic consequences of the war at the European and world level, the impossibility of maintaining current levels of supplies to Ukraine and the impossibility of sustaining a conflict of this intensity over time, we can conclude that the turning point will be the fall of the city of Kherson into Ukrainian hands.

Once this happens, and taking into account the developments we are seeing on the other fronts, the basis for negotiations can be laid. This will end with Russia keeping the Crimean peninsula, retaining control over the area occupied in 2014 or at least part of it, and securing a land corridor that guarantees Crimea's land communication with Russia. The width and management of this corridor will undoubtedly be one of the critical negotiating points.

Some will think that this outcome is unacceptable because it is unfair, since it was won by force of arms. And they will not be wrong. But unfortunately, sometimes even the moral victor has to make painful concessions that will lead him to be despised and even removed from his position in order to minimise the cost of a war which, although just for Ukraine, has already lasted too long.

And we must never forget that, if victory is impossible for anyone, it is for the thousands of men and women who have fallen victim to a war whose origins are all too reminiscent of times gone by.