Lahcen Haddad responds to Bernabé Lopèz García: the Debate Continues
Dear Professor Bernabé Lopèz García
Thank for your response (Atalayar on march 28, 2023) to my reaction (Atalayar, March 25, 2023) to your interview with El Independiente (March 14, 2023) . I have to say you have the merit of responding and engaging in a serene debate, whereas others, in Spain and in France, journalists and MPs alike, write about us Moroccans, but shy away from debating with us. They blame us for not being democratic enough but fail to react to our responses when we criticize their positions. I wonder if some of those who criticize us in Europe think of us as worthy only of their critique but not of their debate: an interesting neocolonial (orientalist?) attitude worth studying in the future, Therefore, I commend your disposition to debate and engage in a healthy exchange of ideas and positions.
Let us go back to the crust of the matter at hand. For you, the Moroccan élite failed to seize the opportunity of the constitutional reform of 2011 to move the country to a real constitutional monarchy. I personally think that the Constitution in itself was quite progressive in letter and in spirit as it has had clear provisions as to: the devolution of more powers to Parliament and the Prime Minister; the separation of legislative, executive and judiciary powers; the recognition of the universal character of human rights; the primacy of the voice of the people via universal suffrage; and the plurality of the “affluents” of Moroccan identity (African, Andalusian, Arabic, Islamic, and Judaic).
But a constitution can only work if the implementation (i.e. the interpretation of the spirit as well the letter of the text) is equally progressive. At this level, there were failures as well as successes. And the rise of the moderate Islamists to power complicated matters for so many within the élite who ended up preferring a conservative rather than a progressive interpretation of the Constitution. The setbacks that you talked about must be seen in this light, but not as failures of the élite; the élite itself has been divided between progressive and conservative interpretations of the 2011 Constitution. But despite the weaknesses, the advances are notable: stronger government; freer parliament; due process; freer press (despite the problems you talked about); and a vibrant civil society and a dynamic public sphere.
The question that underlines your remarks is the following: why did the élite accept to share the power with the Monarchy instead of devolving all the powers to the representatives of the people (Parliament and Government)? While the monarchy is central to the cultural and historical fabric of Moroccans and represents for them the incarnation of the power of the People (as you may know), quite a few within the élite agree that a strong monarchy is necessary for a country that is still struggling to achieve real human development, create jobs, prosperity, and dignity for all. They believe that without an economy with a significant GDP, a wide, dominant, and strong middle class, and a highly educated population that shares the same values of plurality and commonalty, the country cannot move to a full-fledged democratic configuration as in the West. In most Western democracies, it is the wide and strong middle class that guarantees a peaceful alternation between the Right and Left. The stakes are not too high when there is a change of government as the interests of the middle class are upheld by the different players, both within the Right and the Left.
Some countries in the Global South have moved hastily towards democracy, without making sure the conditions are met to guarantee a shift of power without disrupting different stakeholders’ interests. The results are either rulers that make constitutional changes to cling to power or a drift towards autocracy as we are witnessing in Tunisia and Algeria these days. The successes of Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore took place because the shift to democracy happened only when the countries have become economically strong and the middle class prosperous enough and conscious of the stakes at hand to assume a central role in managing the country’s public affairs.
That is why it is important to appreciate the choices made by Moroccans to create piecemeal change and keep a central role for the monarchy while widening the margins for the elected officials to exercise more powers and be accountable to Parliament. Change within continuity is a wise choice made by the King, the élite and the People, in a consensual effort to build the economy and achieve prosperity and craft new political reforms when the time is ripe. I was hoping that a scholar like yourself would explain this complex situation to the Spanish public opinion, which is fed, on a daily basis, the same stereotypes expressed by Spanish opinion leaders about Morocco being an autocratic state.
As far as I am concerned, democracy without real economic dividends (jobs, wealth, well-being, education) is a recipe for failure, if not disaster. And I am not sure that it is democracy that leads to the development of those dividends: historically, very few countries achieved economic development through democracy; in fact, it is the other way around: when they achieved enough wealth and as the middle class (the bourgeoise) became stronger, they were ready to move to a system where they share power; and when they moved to democracy (as was the case with Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Eastern European countries) the change from right to left or vice versa did not threaten the interests of the majority of society, i.e. the middle class, because the state uses the cushions of the wealth accumulated through colonial adventures, exploitation of natural resources, imperialist hegemony, militarized nationalisms to keep those interests intact etc. Moving a to a full-fledged democracy wherein the state is ruled by those accountable to the people through universal suffrage can only work when those dividends are ensured.
On the other hand, I am not sure that international law has provisions that say that guarantees given by sovereign nations can only be trusted if those very nations are democratic states as you have said. That is unheard of. By the way, the 7 wealthiest nations (all of whom happen to be democratic) pledged 100 billion dollars as aid to poor countries to help them build their resilience and adapt better to climate change, as part of the Paris Convention (COP20, 2014). That pledge should have been honored almost immediately, give the urgency of climate change. Almost ten years later, poor countries are still waiting for northern (democratic) countries to honor their commitment. On the other hand, during Covid 19, when democratic countries were scrambling to get their “share” of vaccines by the beginning of 2021, it was China, an allegedly non-democratic country, that honored its international commitment and provided African countries with the first vaccines for their populations. Ample examples exist of democratic countries not honoring their commitments and non-democratic countries honoring their commitments. And vice versa.
Morocco’s commitment regarding the autonomy of Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty should have nothing at all to do with whether it is democratic or not. Sovereignty and territorial integrity were sacrosanct for Moroccans, way before they organized their first elections in the sixties, and even during the years when democratic institutions were shut down (between 1965 and 1977) and are still sacrosanct for them now that they have a new constitution, and the country is freer than it was before.
Of course, this exchange begs the question as to whether Morocco is a democratic country or not. Most Moroccans think that their country is freer, more open, more politically pluralistic, and more tolerant of dissenting voices than it was in the 20th century. The political reforms have paid off but like in every growing democracy there are glitches, challenges and even setbacks. I am personally confident that in due time, Morocco will overcome those hurdles. I appreciate the desire of all Moroccans to move slowly and surely and to work towards economic development in parallel to political openness. Of course, hardcore progressives are frustrated but conservative forces (with entrenched interests) are nervous when things go too rapidly. Walking a fine line between the two, while favoring the emergence of a wide mainstream is the way to go. If we cannot understand that, we will only be expressing sweepingly general value judgments without appreciating the complexity of the matter at hand.
At the end, I will say, thank you for sharing your ideas and reactions. I hope we can continue to exchange despite possible differences between us. I just hope that some of your fellow citizens who write about us without even trying to understand us or engage with us will follow your example.
Yours truly
Lahcen Haddad, PhD