Mali: the end of the French intervention in sight?
While Europe is still waiting to see whether or not there will be war in Ukraine, in other parts of the world where the West and Russia are vying for influence, the situation remains critical. One of these scenarios is the Sahel, a region plagued by jihadist terrorism. The region has recently experienced a series of shocks that have put the possibility of the end of the French presence on the table: the expulsion of the French ambassador to Mali on 31 January, the Malian junta's request for the withdrawal of the Danish contingent from the Takuba Force, followed by the withdrawal of the Swedish contingent, and finally the entry of Russia through the Wagner Group and its warm welcome by the Malian junta.
All this comes at a bad time for the European Union, especially for France, which currently holds the presidency of the Council of the European Union. France sees its ambitions to make Europe more autonomous in foreign policy through its political and military power being undermined by the Sahel dilemma. Domestically, the situation comes at a bad time for Macron, whose political future is at stake in two months. Although he has not yet announced his candidacy, being remembered as the president who let Mali fall into the hands of the jihadists would be a major blow to his legacy, especially for a president who has made foreign policy a feature of his presidency.
The foreseeable end of Barkhane began to take shape in 2019. That year, two French military operations shocked French public opinion about the reality on the ground: in May, two French special operations soldiers died rescuing kidnapped French tourists in Burkina Faso, and in November, the collision of two helicopters in Mali during a sandstorm mission killed 13 soldiers. The latter incident was the deadliest for France since the attacks on French paratroopers in Beirut in 1983. Both incidents were covered in the French press, as evidenced by the live broadcast of the funeral for the two servicemen killed in the May 2019 mission1. The deaths in both missions most likely contributed to a sense among the French that Barkhane was an unnecessary waste of lives and resources in a theatre of operations that the average French citizen found no reason to stay. As a result, support for Barkhane began to fall in France: according to a January 2021 Le Point magazine poll, 51 per cent of respondents opposed the French presence in Mali2.
Popular weariness was compounded by a growing sense that the countries in the region were not contributing enough to fight the terrorist threat, despite French and EU assistance. France decided to bring the G5-Sahel countries together and encourage them to take more responsibility. However, such calls for attention, rather than being seen as a way of cooperating to confront a common enemy, most likely had the opposite effect of antagonising the countries in the region against France, which they saw as a paternalistic power scolding them for their bad behaviour. In Mali, this sentiment was heightened by the international community's reaction to the May 2021 coup: France decided to cut its military aid and ECOWAS cut diplomatic relations and isolated the country.
Such isolation most likely influenced Bamako to turn to Russia to address the jihadist threat, especially given that unlike ECOWAS and France, Russia did not object to Mali's government emerging from a coup d'état.
As a result, Moscow came into play, through the Wagner Group. Russian support for the Bamako government is also likely to be behind the expulsion of the French ambassador from Mali and the withdrawal of Swedish and Danish troops. For the military junta ruling Mali, Russian intervention is more in line with its needs in terms of firmness in the face of the jihadist threat (elimination of the adversary without regard for civilian casualties) than French intervention, which in the eyes of the Malian population has worsened the jihadist threat. Nor can we ignore the links between the Malian military and Russia, as many of Mali's army commanders were trained in Russia and Moscow is Mali's main arms supplier. Both links probably benefited the rapprochement with Moscow through fond memories of Russian military training and the perception of Russian weaponry as proof of its good faith towards Mali, contrary to the constraints imposed by Paris and ECOWAS.
Russia's entry into Mali and Bamako's explicit hostility to the French and European presence in the area have opened the door to the end of Barkhane in Mali. Although no date has yet been set for the departure of French troops, it is assumed that this will happen. It is also very likely that the Takuba force and EU training missions will leave. The risks of a French withdrawal go beyond the country falling into the hands of jihadists and thus destabilising the Sahel: if France and, by extension, Brussels leave the area, the reputational blow to both would be severe. More so for Brussels than Paris, as it is very likely that the much-vaunted European autonomy will be seen as totally dependent on France, not a good thing for a political bloc that is not supposed to depend for its common security on the actions of a single country.
There is also the dilemma of where Barkhane will resettle after his withdrawal from Mali. It is very likely that Barkhane will move to Niger or Burkina Faso, neighbours of Mali, members of the G5 Sahel and with a French military presence. However, anti-French sentiment is very strong in both countries, a factor that will most likely contribute to destabilising the governments of both countries. This is particularly relevant in Burkina Faso, where a coup junta seized power in January 2022 and the country is experiencing a degradation of its security caused by jihadist terrorism from Mali. Another option is to move to Chad, which also hosts French troops and has a good army. However, it is far from the main theatre of operations (Mali) and its government is not exactly the most democratic in the region, as it is ruled by a transitional military junta led by the son of the deceased president. Settling in Chad would most likely be seen as support for its power, which would call into question the European discourse on democracy promotion in the region, as questions would be raised as to why the Chadian junta is being supported when Mali's was treated with an iron fist. This risks appearing hypocritical, making it difficult to explain to European public opinion the importance of the Sahel as a theatre of operations for its security.
In conclusion, the likelihood of French withdrawal from Mali has increased in the last two months following the Malian junta's decision to expel the French ambassador, call for the withdrawal of European troops and warmly welcome Russian assistance. All of this has the potential to deal a severe blow to the reputation of the EU and France, which would be seen as incapable of managing their security on their own. While it is true that popular support for Barkhane had waned since 2019, when two military operations opened French public opinion's eyes to the situation in the region, the coups in Mali and the perception of the countries in the region as second best to French demands for more resources against terrorism have been key to the current situation. The sanctions imposed on Mali after the last coup in May 2021 probably contributed to the orientation towards Moscow, which has not hesitated to support Mali through the Wagner group. Barkhane's withdrawal from Mali and his foreseeable relocation to neighbouring countries is not without risk, as these countries have a strong anti-French sentiment that will most likely be reinforced by the presence of French troops. Moreover, there is a risk of legitimising coup governments, running the risk of appearing hypocritical towards some countries (Mali) but permissive towards others (Chad).
References:
1 See, “Hommage national aux deux commandos: les cercueils des militaires quittent la cour des Invalides”, France 24, mayo del 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MAxxrQO2IbY
2 Sahel : La moitié des Français opposés á la présence française, Le Point, enero del 2021, https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/sahel-la-moitie-des-francais-opposes-a-la-presence-francaise-11-01-2021-2409098_24.php