Mali: a surprise coup or the final result of a latent malaise?
On August 18 an uprising overthrew President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and the prime minister, Boubou Cissé. Since then the domestic and foreign media have analysed the causes and possible consequences of the coup. But before investigating why there has been a coup d'état in Mali, we need to answer a few questions: where is Mali on the map, why is a coup d'état in this country so relevant to Spain, and what are the reasons behind such an uprising?
Mali is a country on the African continent, in the Sahel to be precise, a geographical belt that is the natural border between the Sahara Desert and the jungle. It is a country with high birth rates and poverty, a multi-ethnic population with several different languages and lifestyles, and weak government structures.
The scourge of Jihadist terrorism has placed this battered state in the spotlight. In 2012, a rebellion of Tuareg separatists was exploited by Jihadist groups to attempt to occupy the country. To complicate matters further, the military - dissatisfied with the government - took power by force. This made the situation worse, resulting in the north of the country being under the control of Jihadists and separatists by the end of 2012. When at the beginning of 2013 they advanced towards the capital, Bamako, France intervened militarily to stop the bleeding. Although it managed to recover the lost ground, it did not put an end to the threat.
Since then the situation has worsened. Although the government has not lost ground, violence has increased and mutated. It is no longer only Jihadist and separatist, but also inter-ethnic, as the events of 2012 sparked rivalries between those groups which -attracted by Jihadist siren songs of greater social justice- supported the terrorists and those who suffered retaliation. This tension, fuelled by long-standing conflicts over different ways of life and a sense of oppression, has been the most intense in recent years.
In addition to this, Mali has become the new theatre of operations against Jihadism. There are four missions for this purpose: France's Barkhane, which has conducted military operations since 2013 to fight against terrorists not only in Mali but also in neighbouring countries; the United Nations' MINUSMA, responsible for overseeing the country's security; EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali, both of the European Union, which trains the Malian army and police. Spain contributes to the UN mission and to those of the EU. As a result, in addition to the violence described above, there are attacks against troops from these missions, where the Malians are collateral victims, worsening their suffering.
The Malian political class, led by President IBK, has not lived up to expectations. Although peace was signed with the Tuareg separatists in 2015 through the Algiers agreements, its implementation has stagnated, causing a conflict in the north of the country-the theatre of operations of the Jihadist groups. Local and foreign experts say the blame lies with the government, which has prioritised mistrust of the Tuaregs for their separatist desires rather than an opportunity to end a conflict and begin to unite the country. Corruption and nepotism have been accentuated by IBK, which has placed its son Karim, who loves the good life, at the head of the parliamentary defence committee, with no experience in this field.
This year the authorities' sense of incompetence has been reinforced. The March legislative elections were described as fraudulent. With a turnout of 35 percent, the governing party was "granted" ten seats. This gesture angered the people, who saw their electoral wishes trampled underfoot. As if this were not enough, the leader of the opposition, Soumaïla Cissé, was kidnapped on the 25th of that month. It is not yet known where he is.
However, what has angered the Malians most is the government's inability to stop the violence ravaging the country, both from Jihadist groups and from ethnic militias. The Economist magazine published on August 8 reports that 1,800 people have died during the first six months of the year (by now this figure will have increased). This number is equal to last year's total. As if this were not enough, United Nations reports accuse the Malian army of being involved in inter-ethnic massacres, particularly that of Ogossagou in March 2019, one of the worst since the beginning of the conflict, with 150 deaths.
These three factors -institutional corruption, electoral fraud and insecurity- explain the coup d'état and the popular protests that have been calling for the president's resignation since June through the coalition Mouvement Cinq de June-Rassemblement des Forces Populaires (M5-RFP in French). The visible head of this coalition is Imam Mahmoud Dicko, a charismatic leader who opposed government reforms aimed at emancipating women in the past. Despite Dicko's record, the movement has remained committed to the goal (achieved by the military) of driving the IBK from power.
For Spain -the southern flank of Europe- the Dantesque scenario of a caliphate in this country would place the Jihadist threat close to our borders. This, together with the fact that Mali is a country of emission and transit of migrants towards Europe (with Spain as a gateway), could be used by terrorists as a gateway to perpetrate attacks in Spain.
In conclusion, the coup d'état that has taken place in Mali is the culmination of a series of factors affecting the country since 2012: an attempt at secession that mutated into a Jihadist offensive resulted in an increase in violence in the country, both by the Jihadists and by ethnic conflicts, revived by the events of 2012. Government corruption and inability to alleviate violence, coupled with this year's electoral fraud, resulted in a series of popular protests against the government. The military, sick of being cannon fodder for inept government and with a reputation tainted by allegations of complicity in inter-ethnic massacres and human rights abuses, ended up rising to the heat of popular protest.
Where does it go from here? The reaction of ECOWAS, the main regional body, is an indicator of the dilemmas the region faces as a result of the Malian uprising. In the first days, the organisation excluded Mali from its bodies, closed borders with it and threatened military intervention to restore democracy. However, in recent days its position has relaxed, as witnessed on September 16 at the meeting in Accra between ECOWAS and the CNSP (the body set up by the coup leaders to run Mali). At this meeting it was agreed that the transition period would last 18 months, would be led by civilians, the CNSP would be dissolved at the end of these 18 months period and the sanctions would be lifted when the transition had come to an end (successfully).
Such a turnaround is better understood when one considers that the past events have raised the old spectre of a coup d'état, a constant in the region's countries since they gained independence. Furthermore, countries like Guinea-Conakry and Côte d'Ivoire are facing elections in October, with respective rulers attempting to hold on to power despite popular discontent. With this information, it is not surprising that ECOWAS initially adopted a harsh reaction against Mali. Better to stop the "disease" at its roots than to prevent it from spreading.
We will have to keep an eye on what happens over the next 18 months in order to draw conclusions. Will there be an increase in both Jihadist and inter-ethnic violence? Will the military be capable of restoring order? Will the transition be successful? These are the questions we will have to ask ourselves in the coming months regarding what happened in Mali.