Opinion

The new migration crisis in the Canary Islands: a symptom of a larger problem

photo_camera Atalayar_ Crisis Migratoria Canarias

This autumn of 2020, fourteen years after the "crisis of the cayucos", the Canary Islands have once again become one of the favourite destinations on the migration routes from West Africa and the Maghreb. This week the Arguineguín quay, located in Mogán, Gran Canaria, has been vacated. The quay was established in August in an improvised reception centre for immigrants. For three months, thousands of immigrants have been housed and held in precarious conditions; at the worst moments, more than 2,500 people were crammed into a space originally intended for 400. However, the closure of the quay - which will continue to operate for reception and screening - does not mean that the arrival of immigrants will be stopped or that the situation will be brought under control. Beyond the simplistic rhetoric of some media and journalists, both those who present immigrants as a threat to security and those who victimize them, the new Canary Islands migration crisis is a complex and difficult to manage scenario.

Let us begin with the causes: Why has the Canary Islands' route been reactivated? Some 20,000 immigrants have arrived in the archipelago this year, 8,000 of them in the last two months. Approximately half of them come from the Maghreb, while the other half originate from various countries in West Africa and the Sahel. Although the destination is the same, there are two different routes: immigrants from West Africa leave either from the coast of Senegal or from Nouadhibou, north of Mauritania. The Moroccans, in contrast, travel from the north and centre of the country to Tarfaya in the south or to Boujdour, El Aaiun or Dakhla in the Western Sahara, where they embark for the Canary Islands.

As the journalist Helena Malero pointed out, the economic crisis caused by the Coronavirus has significantly affected countries such as Senegal and the Gambia. Hundreds of young people who have left the increasingly unprofitable fishing industry for activities associated with tourism - working in hotels, shops and restaurants or as tourist guides and street vendors - have lost their jobs due to the closure of borders. In Mali, the insecurity caused by violence and political instability, including a coup d'état, has encouraged many people to leave the country. At the same time, the pandemic has ended the relative freedom of movement between ECOWAS member countries. The increased border surveillance and the increased danger on the Saharan route-unstable in Mali, civil war in Libya, Jihadist violence in the Sahel-has led to the Canary Islands route being perceived as the safest, despite the risks involved in sailing in the Atlantic-almost half a thousand people died in several shipwrecks in October alone. The desire to migrate is taken advantage of by the always mentioned-though little known-mafias, which in practice act as migration agencies offering protection and accommodation during land travel, assistance at border crossings, local guides and boats from the north of Mauritania in exchange for exorbitant prices. Those who cannot afford it try their luck from fishing ports such as Mbour, with somewhat more affordable rates, although the journey from Senegal is much riskier: eight to ten days by sea and very frequent accidents, approximately one in ten of the cayucos are shipwrecked.

As for Morocco, the paralysis of economic activity as a result of the pandemic is added to the revival of the conflict between Polisario and the Moroccan armed forces. Despite the relatively good macroeconomic results for Morocco, the local population has seen its standard of living fall in recent years owing to the rise in prices. In 2019, the Moroccan government increased the minimum wage for the first time since 2012. It is now set at around 175 euros per month for the agricultural sector and around 250 euros per month in industry and services. However, rising unemployment - especially in the tourism sector - has caused many families to lose part of their income. To this must be added the unrest of part of the population, especially in the Rif region - where there were intense demonstrations in 2016 and 2017 that caused many political exiles, most of whom have not been recognized as refugees by the European authorities. Given the existence of migratory support networks in Spain and France, many people have decided to take risks and try to reach Europe in an irregular manner, often using the aforementioned mafias, which are however different from those that traffic in people from West Africa. Generally, Moroccans pay twice as much as sub-Saharans and travel in smaller and safer boats, with shorter crossing times and less risk of accidents and shipwrecks.

The causes, in short, are varied, but can be summarised as an economic crisis stemming from the pandemic, political instability in Libya and the Sahel-which complicates the Saharan-Mediterranean route-and the closure of borders, which hinders land migration. However, the causes of immigration are only part of the issue. The management of arrivals, which is the responsibility of the state, has left much to be desired. The precarious situation at the Arguineguín dock is evidence of the lack of means and foresight on the part of the Spanish authorities, who had the previous experience of 2006 and information on the ground. After all, since the first "cayuco crisis" Spain has been actively collaborating with the police of Senegal, Mauritania and other Sahel and West African countries, not to mention the large amount of money given each year to Morocco to, in theory, combat irregular immigration.

Beyond this lack of foresight, the government's action is more than worthy of criticism. For weeks there have been hundreds of people crammed into extremely harsh and unhealthy conditions-the Spanish ombudsman and international organisations such as Human Rights Watch have denounced the fact that fundamental rights are being violated. Many of these people have now been accommodated in hotels on the island of Gran Canaria and are awaiting deportation - or transport to the mainland in the unlikely event that their asylum claims are processed. It is true that the closure of the borders has complicated the situation, but the government's solution - banning journalists from the dock - has only revealed a complete lack of resources and planning. And this is not a one-off event: as I denounced at the beginning of the year, the Spanish asylum system has been completely overwhelmed since 2019.

The situation is not simple, and can only be addressed if we renounce certain commonplaces that abound in the migration discourse. A few months ago I spoke in another article about the paradox of the fight against irregular migration: the more money is invested in expanding border surveillance, the more people turn to the services of criminal organisations. To this paradox, we should add a myth, constantly in the mouths of politicians and journalists. The famous "aid at source", which nobody specifies what it consists of, does not serve to stop migratory flows. The countries that produce most migrants are those with average incomes; economic development encourages families to send one or more of their members abroad to contribute to remittances.

Precisely because in most cases migration is not a drama - a metaphor that some media and journalists love - but a more or less calculated decision aimed at increasing family or personal income, it will not stop no matter how much we support the economies of the countries of origin. As I mentioned earlier, the minimum wage in Morocco is 250 euros per month. Is it not logical that many young Moroccans try to seek their fortune in Spain or France, where the minimum wage is several times that amount? Is this not the same kind of reasoning that leads many young Spaniards to settle in Germany or the United Kingdom?

Only by understanding this reality can irregular migration be tackled with a sustainable strategy in the medium and long term. The opposite is to put in place patches that only benefit human traffickers and security and surveillance companies. Migration is a natural process, not a drama or a threat. If the conditions of entry into Europe are not made more flexible and easier - for example, with temporary visas - more and more people will try to enter illegally, to the benefit of the mafias and employers who take advantage of a labour force without rights and who do not pay taxes. If the risks of irregular migration are not reported in the countries of origin and safe and legal alternatives are offered, boats and canoes will continue to cross the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, with all the human losses that this implies. If money is not invested in integration and training of those already here, there is a risk of creating ghettos that will increase social unrest. If we only spend migration funds on surveillance and security or on ineffective 'aid at source', we will be trying to put doors in the field. The idea of "Fortress Europe" is unsustainable in the long run, especially if - hopefully - the European Union remains an economically dynamic region. Just as we participate in global flows of goods and capital, it is logical to assume that we are part of a global labour market, with all the challenges and opportunities that this implies. We can continue to deny this fact or assume it and plan and legislate - and report - accordingly.