Opinion

Niger, epicentre of the fight against terrorism in the Sahel

photo_camera fuerzas-seguridad-mali

Hay que recordar que Níger es la base de operaciones contra el terrorismo de EE. UU. y donde la semana pasada y gracias a la intermediación del Presidente de Níger fue liberada una monja estadounidense que estaba secuestrada desde abril y que fue el resultado de las negociaciones entre las autoridades nigerinas y el Grupo de Apoyo al Islam y a los musulmanes.

After France's exit from Mali, Niger is the new base in the fight against jihadist terrorism in the Sahel, not only for France but also for Burkina Faso, which shares a border with Niger and Mali. 

France and the Barkhane force are based in Niger where they are also being criticised by various local sectors who see this French redeployment as too late, too far from the area of operations of jihadist terrorism and the cause of more attacks by these groups due to the French presence in the territory. 

The question is: can Operation Barkhane do better in Niger? The evident failure of the French counter-terrorism mission in Mali leaves some sceptical, unless there is a radical change in strategy, and more risk-taking. 

Last Sunday, Burkina's President of the Transition visited Niger to meet with President Bazoum to discuss security issues within the tri-border area, especially in the areas of information, resource sharing and the operational side of the fight against jihadism. 

It should be remembered that Niger is the US base of operations against terrorism and that last week, thanks to the mediation of the President of Niger, an American nun who had been kidnapped since April was freed as a result of negotiations between the Nigerien authorities and the Support Group for Islam and Muslims.

Equally noteworthy is the work of the US in Niger where most of the success in eliminating jihadist groups has been achieved on the basis of intelligence provided by the Americans. The Americans provide intelligence to France, they also provide supplies. Aerial refuelling is provided, for about 30 to 40 per cent (of aircraft), by the US.

According to France 24, there was no financial compensation in exchange for the release of the American nun. The terrorist group JNIM had asked for the release of 16 fighters, but only one is said to have been released.  

According to local sources, the operation was reportedly carried out without the support of Western partners. The nun was transported to Niamey, where a US special forces helicopter was waiting for her. 

This release is the first major success of the Nigerian authorities' negotiation policy with the terrorists, which began several months ago. President Mohamed Bazoum's objective was to invite the jihadists to lay down their arms. 

This is why Burkina Faso and Niger are considering joint operations on their territories in order to fight terrorism effectively. The information comes from a press release published by the Burkina Faso presidency on Monday 22 August on Facebook. 

According to officials from both countries, this initiative aims not only to respond to the challenges facing their various national armed forces, but also to regain control of the situation. To this end, the two states plan to strengthen cooperation in the field of defence through a military cooperation agreement and to increase joint operations on the ground.

Beyond one-off operations, we plan to do regular and permanent operations to allow our forces to occupy the land, take control of the land and that we cannot leave an inch to terrorists in both Niger and Burkina Faso," said Niger's defence minister. 

It should be noted that the Burkina Faso and Niger authorities also aim to expand their joint operations project in Mali for better synergy of actions and in Benin for more convincing results at the level of their common borders. 

This is the right approach: the fight against jihadist terrorism in the Sahel must always be conducted first at the local level and then at the regional level, with international assistance in a coordinated manner, but always at the local level. 

Regional action requires strong bilateral cooperation between Burkina Faso and Mali, and also between Burkina Faso and Niger, in order to overcome this long border with Mali. With Niger, this bilateral cooperation already exists through the joint operation Taanli, an operation that takes place regularly every six months. And with Mali, Burkina Faso is seeing to what extent it can actually obtain bilateral cooperation. 

Similarly, the countries of the Gulf of Guinea must reinforce their security because jihadist terrorism has already made its presence felt in these countries after the attacks that Côte d'Ivoire experienced between 2019 and 2020, targeted Benin and Togo. Togo has already been attacked at least three or four times and attacks are becoming more frequent and deadly. Benin has also been the target of several attacks, which is why a new strategy for the Sahel and a new regional strategy are urgently needed. 

It should be recalled that France is also accompanying the Gulf of Guinea countries that are under threat from jihadist groups, but from Nigerian territory. But there will be no French forces deployed in Togo, no French forces deployed in Benin, no French [anti-terrorist] forces deployed in Côte d'Ivoire.  

So there will be no French military presence in these countries, but on a case-by-case basis, from Nigerian territory, the French will accompany these countries in the fight against terrorism. The creation of the International Academy for the Fight against Terrorism (AILCT), which will be set up on 10 June 2021 in Jacqueville, near Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, is also very important. 

In Benin, for example, President Macron said it will be mainly equipment, training and intelligence sharing

France has learned the lesson after the exit from Mali and they want to be much less visible, to be present without being visible, this is the doctrine today. So the strategy is to be present without being visible, providing support to the Sahel and Gulf of Guinea countries, but having a greater presence in Niger, from Niger, to operations in other countries. 

France has learned from its bad results in Mali and, in order not to repeat the same mistakes in the Gulf of Guinea, its new strategy for military presence in the sub-region involves being present but not visible, adopting a low profile and letting the bulk of counter-terrorism operations be carried out by the countries of the region.