Not everything is about democracy
After the end of the extensive but short-lived protests in Kazakhstan, violently repressed by the Tokayev government assisted by the security apparatus of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation) and especially Russia, it is time to reflect on the causes, impact and consequences of demonstrations that shook the foundations of the Kazakh regime and threatened the stability of Central Asia.
In this regard, several recent reports have emphasised the pro-democracy demands of the demonstrators, pointing to the evident absence of democratic guarantees in a state dominated by a single party, Nur Otán, and where the current president Tokayev was imposed by his predecessor Nazarbayev. The media networks in Europe and North America, as well as a large number of analysts, experts and think tanks, have presented the Kazakh uprisings as a classic example of the uprising of a people yearning for greater freedom, respect for human rights, and the establishment of real democracy. This was expressed in the 8 January editorial of El Mundo, Spain's second most widely read newspaper. The New York Times also emphasised the country's desire for democratisation in an article on 5 January.
This story, then, focuses on the democracy-dictatorship dichotomy. According to this reading, the Kazakh demonstrators, like the Belarusians last year, the Ukrainians in 2014 or the Arabs throughout the Arab Spring, are above all demanding a transition to a Western-style liberal democratic system.
This view of demonstrations in developing countries presents liberal democracy based on human rights as the high point of history and civilisation, influenced by a linear interpretation of history: the growth and development of countries go in one direction, marked by societies in Europe and North America. This Eurocentric interpretation of history applies a Western recipe to non-Western countries, treated as aspiring to reach the goal already crossed by prosperous and democratic European countries.
This presentation of the facts or, as the Anglo-Saxons say, 'framing', is the one that most convinces us Europeans, both for the general public and for the big media conglomerates.
However, the consolidation of China, as well as the growth of the Persian Gulf monarchies, through very different political-economic and social systems, has challenged the validity of this linear view of history. For many countries, China today represents a very attractive social and economic model, more so than the liberal Western example. Kazakhstan, whose GDP is now three times that of 2005, seems to be based more on the Chinese model - no doubt conditioned by its commercial dependence on Beijing and its geographical proximity.
There is no doubt that the enlightened ideas of democracy, human rights and separation of powers are attractive to a good part of the people in Kazakhstan and other countries with authoritarian governments. However, we should be wary of the framing in Europe of these revolts, as well as so many others before them, including the Arab Spring. Often pro-democracy demands are less central than they seem, and it is instead economic reasons that drive revolts and revolutions. Inequality, shortages of basic foodstuffs or lack of opportunities are sometimes more decisive factors than lack of democracy.
The revolts in Kazakhstan in early January, for example, were mainly motivated by the rising price of liquefied petroleum gas, used by the majority of the country's citizens for transportation. Undoubtedly, dissatisfaction with the authoritarianism and corruption of the Tokayev government has also played a role in the unrest in Kazakhstan, but it would be a mistake to consider this as the main cause of the revolts.
The Arab Springs that began in 2010 were also covered from Europe as a series of revolts inspired by the democratic yearnings of a population aspiring to move their states towards the liberal, secular European system. This reading of the Arab Spring assumes that there is no valid alternative to the Western model, ignoring the fact that the countries where the uprisings took place have their own history, political tradition and social and legal configuration. History is not linear; it is not the same everywhere, and the Western system is not the ultimate goal for all other societies.
A detailed study by the New England Complex Systems Institute (NECSI) in 2012 found a strong link between rising food prices and the proliferation of food riots in dozens of African and Middle Eastern countries. Many of the uprisings were framed as part of a global battle for democracy, rather than a focus on the scarcity of basic food staples. The NECSI study, the graph of which can be seen below, suggests that as food prices rise, so do the riots. It is striking that while most of the countries examined by the study have been ruled by authoritarian regimes throughout their recent history, social unrest and mass revolutions have occurred mostly when food prices have risen.
The consequence of this Eurocentric view is to erase the agency (i.e. the possibility of being able to decide for oneself, independent of undoubted external influences) of the protesters in these societies, who are seen as little more than a mass that aspires to nothing more than transforming their countries along Western lines, ignoring that each culture, society and country has its own idiosyncrasies, and that the material conditions in each particular country often explain why mass protests take place.
This biased and often self-serving reading of such revolts from Europe and North America is not unique. Russia's interpretation of recent protests in neighbouring countries (including Kazakhstan) also removes the agency of those who took to the streets unhappy with their governments and (especially in the case of Belarusian protesters) wary of Moscow's enormous influence in their country. Such protests are seen by Moscow as mere EU interference. In the case of Kazakhstan, Putin's government called the riots an attempted 'coup d'état' emboldened by European and US governments.
Turning a deaf ear to the real demands of the people and treating them as mere instruments serving European interests serves the Kremlin to eliminate the agency and autonomy of Belarusians, Georgians or Kazakhs, thus justifying its influence over their governments to consolidate its sphere of influence. The Russian regime, worried by the pro-European tendency of a large part of the citizens in the former Soviet republics, and terrified by the prospect of losing control over the countries it considers to be in its orbit, thus manufactures its own particular framing, which does not match the reality of the protesters' demands, but rather a narrative that is easy for the Kremlin to communicate. The consequence is the same as the framing done in Europe: reducing the demonstrations of millions of people to an instrument that can be manipulated by other governments, rather than recognising the agency and judgement of citizens.
No wonder Russia also considered the millions of North Africans and Arabs who have demonstrated during the Arab Spring since 2010 as instruments of the US and Europe. In this way, the Kremlin insinuates that the masses in these countries cannot be outraged on their own, but that their demands (economic, democratic, or both) actually respond to perverse interests in Paris, London or Washington.
The conclusion is clear: what is happening in countries like Kazakhstan, Egypt or Belarus cannot be explained exclusively by a framing developed in other countries and according to a pre-packaged narrative for the convenience of audiences.
Misrepresenting the reality of what happened on the streets of Almaty, Tunis or Minsk in a way that can be better sold to audiences in Russia, Europe or the United States is not only untruthful, but also ignores a series of legitimate demands that are intimately related to the context in developing countries, and consequently erases the idiosyncrasies of these countries and the very autonomy of the people who provoke these protests.