Rejection of the "Lebanisation" of Iran

Women, life and freedom. Unlike the November 2019 uprising, in which the Islamic Republic suppressed the revolt in five days, the regime is incapable of defeating a people committed to the cause of a revolution, not a civil war.

Many of the "experts" who claimed that the Iranian events were simply a spontaneous response to the assassination of Mahsa Amini by the morality police were wrong to predict that the uprising would be quickly stopped by a bloody crackdown. 

The only legitimate question to ask today is about the future of the country: what about Iran in a fortnight's time? And in six months' time? According to the theory elaborated by the Ministry of Intelligence or by the so-called reformist intellectuals, totally rejected by the Supreme Leader, there would be only one way out: civil war. Iran would be destined to become Syria or Libya. 

This idea is being spread with interest by the reformists and their powerful lobbies, including in France. And the message is very clear: "You saw what happened in Syria and Libya, do you want the same in Iran? Come to your senses and we, the reformists, will take back the reins and listen to the people...". 

In 1978, the Shah had already shown Lebanon as a rejectionist. Not only did the strategy fail miserably, but the supposedly inevitable scenario never happened. To this day, in Iran, civil war is only a spectre stirred up by politicians whose sole aim is to preserve their prerogatives.... 

While the Shah could still hope to find a way out after his resignation, the mullahs will fight to the bitter end. Hence, for some, the strong likelihood of civil war. But this scenario is not only due to the obstinacy of the leadership and the state of their military forces. It is necessary to examine the social and historical conditions. 

Unlike Syria, Libya and Lebanon, which have been "secluded" countries since the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, Iran is a country with almost three thousand years of national coexistence that mixes different ideologies and ethnic groups. And in its history, Iran has never experienced a massive civil war. Better still, in its contemporary history, Iran has always had a relatively strong central government, even under weaker central governments such as Qajar. No province in the country has been able to enjoy even relative independence or autonomy. However, ethnic Iranians have never spoken of separatism, except at the instigation of foreigners. 

The most obvious example is undoubtedly the Kurdish People's Movement of Iran. Unlike the Kurdish movements in Iraq, Turkey and Syria, Iran's Kurds have never claimed separatism. Their historical desire for autonomy is part of the preservation of national sovereignty. The same is true of Iran's ethnic Turkic minority, the largest ethnic minority in the country. Only at one point in history have they shown a desire for independence; under pressure from Stalin's Soviet Union. Moreover, Iran's governments have never been regionally or locally based. Today, the rule of the mullahs is as hated in the religious city of Qom as it is in the northern cities or in the Kurdistan region, Sistan or Baluchistan. 

After the defeat of the constitutional revolution in 1906, Iran's history has witnessed several liberation movements: the uprising in Tabriz, capital of Azerbaijan province, against a despotic king; a regional movement called the "Jungle Movement" in northern Iran; a nationalist military rebellion in Khorasan province. All were quickly suppressed by the powerful central government of the time. But these movements, though "regional", never considered their aim to be limited to one region. 

The system of the "Velayat-e-Faqih", i.e. the Supreme Leader, is fully backed by a special army created under the name of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is totally outside the control of the government. The IRGC derives its coherence and continuity from the very nature of the Velayat-e-Faqih system and the person of the Vali faghih (the religious authority in charge of the management of Islamic society). In the event of a fatal blow to the Velayat-e-Faqih system, the IRGC will disintegrate on its own, without any justification. The idea of the IRGC's continuity without religious authority is due to insufficient knowledge of the ideological aspect of this army. Moreover, it is not for nothing that in the current uprising, after Khamenei, the IRGC and the Bassidj militias are the main targets of the insurgents' slogans and hatred. 

The Iranian revolution of the last two months shows the convergence of all the ethnic and even religious diversity of the entire Iranian people against the integrity of the Iranian regime. When the popular uprising took place in the cities of Iranian Kurdistan, people all over Iran shouted: "I sacrifice my life for Iran, from Kurdistan to Tehran". And when Baluchistan was attacked and many people were martyred, the slogan of the Iranian people was: "From Zahedan to Tehran, I will sacrifice my life for Iran". 

Therefore, not only in Kurdistan and Baluchistan, but also in Khuzestan and Azerbaijan, the special rights of these regions are not mentioned. They all sing with one voice against Khamenei and the religious tyranny. Because everyone knows that the only way to realise their rights is to put an end to this criminal regime and establish a democratic and secular republic. 

This simple fact invalidates all the baseless theories of the "Lebanisation" of Iran.