Sahel: instability continues

The last few months have been characterised by the reactivation of hotspots around the world, such as the Ukrainian and Palestinian conflicts. These are now joined by the Sahel. Three events between April and May attest to this: the death in combat of Chadian President Idris Déby in April, the execution of journalists David Beriáin and Roberto Fraile in Burkina Faso and, this week, the military coup d'état in Mali - the second in less than a year - against the transitional civilian government.

These three events have in common the characteristic of demonstrating that the region is still a hotbed of instability, despite the fact that media interest in the region has diminished compared to the echo of the first coup in Mali in August last year. Moreover, all three show that instability has spread, something that international intervention has failed to stop.

The death of Chad's newly re-elected president Idriss Déby on April 19, fighting rebels of the The Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), put Chad in the spotlight. Chad is a key country in the G5 Sahel because, unlike its neighbours, it has a tough and disciplined army and is the largest contributor of troops to the coalition. It is also France's staunchest ally in the region. Proof of this is the fact that headquarters for Operation Barkhane is located in N'Djamena, the Chadian capital, even though Mali is the main theatre of operations.

However, Déby's death calls into question the above-described image of the G5 strong country. The FACT rebels were 300 kilometres from the capital at the time the president was killed, demonstrating the Chadian army's weakness in controlling its borders, especially given that it borders fragile Libya to the north. Proof that something was not right is the fact that French aircraft had bombed the rebels in 20191. Now with his son in power, the country's stability is under question, especially whether he will be able to balance his troop deployment in the region with the need to defeat FACT. The latter is relevant, as the last time they fought, it was FACT that almost took control of the country in 2008.

Moreover, a hypothetical fall of the Chadian government would spread instability across the north, centre and east of the continent. In addition to bordering Libya, Chad is bordered to the south by the Central African Republic, another hotspot of instability, and to the east by the volatile Darfur region of Sudan. In a worst-case scenario, we would be talking about the spread of the terrorist threat to the centre and east of the continent.

When journalists David Beriáin and Roberto Fraile were killed in Burkina Faso, it showed that patterns of inter-ethnic and jihadist violence imported from Mali are being reproduced in the country. This trend, which began in 2015 in the north, has spread to the centre and east, with the formation of a local group Ansarul Islam and the establishment of the Islamic State of the Greater Sahel. What happens in Burkina Faso may have a contagion effect in West Africa, especially in Côte d'Ivoire, a country with a history of civil war and instability, and Togo and Benin, so far immune to the jihadist threat.

Finally, the coup d'état by the Malian military against the civilian transitional junta that has ruled the country since August 2020 shows that the situation in the country is far from stabilised. The international community has condemned the coup. It is not yet clear why the coup was staged, although the idea is gaining momentum that the coup was a reaction to the transitional government's decision to remove two key military officers from the government in the August coup. If this is true - I repeat that the coup leaders have to speak out - it would show that civilian power remains weak in the face of military power. If in the end the military takes control and purges the civilians from the transitional government, it would be interesting to observe the debate forming in the European Union between the primacy of security or the promotion of democracy.

The case of the relationship between France and Chad, where Paris supported a non-democratic regime in exchange for the fight against terrorism, can serve as a reference point for Mali.

In conclusion, the Sahel continues to prove to be a powder keg. The death of Chad's president in April, the assassination of two Spanish journalists and this week's coup in Mali corroborate this. The first showed that Chad was not as stable as it appeared, despite having the best army in the G5 Sahel. With his son in power, the country's stability is in question, which has the potential to destabilise the centre and east of the continent.

The assassinations in Burkina Faso put on the table the rise of violence in this hinge country between the Sahel and the West African coast with the likelihood of spillover into countries with a history of war and violence such as Côte d'Ivoire.

Finally, the recent coup in Mali demonstrates the fragility of civilian power vis-à-vis military power. While the coup plotters have yet to make a statement on the motives behind the coup, if it were to end in an all-military government, it would put the EU in the dilemma of either continuing its security missions in a country with an authoritarian government in the name of counter-terrorism or freezing missions until the 'status quo' is restored in the name of democracy and human rights.

1. See: “Airstrikes and “stability”: What’s the French army doing in Chad?” Airstrikes and "stability": What's the French army doing in Chad? | African Arguments.