Strategies and tactics in Morocco and Algeria, neighbours that repel each other
In physics, as in geopolitics, when internal crisis factors accumulate, become entrenched and irreversible, the only possible way out lies in an explosion, whether uncontrolled or controlled, which allows access to a new state in which internal forces find a new equilibrium. This is as valid for a hailstorm and a volcanic eruption as it is for a military confrontation, whether internal social in the form of a civil war, or external between neighbours who have run out of bridges of dialogue, harmony and consensus.
Relations between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Republic of Algeria are a case in point. Bilateral tension continues to rise and ties between the two are breaking down one by one, presaging a violent end.
There are three areas of friction between Algiers and Rabat, one of them active, the Western Sahara issue, and the other two dormant, the border treaty and the Eastern Sahara issue.
It was signed by the two heads of state, Algeria's Huari Boumedien and Morocco's Hassan II in 1972, but was not ratified by the Moroccan parliament, so it has no legal status, and therefore was not registered with the United Nations. Today it remains unimplemented on the ground, and the land borders between the two countries are undefined and in legal limbo. Critical, albeit controlled, episodes regularly occur involving the inhabitants of border villages through which real convoys of smugglers pass. The situation has become even more tense, particularly since 1994, when the land border was officially closed. A little less than two years ago, the inhabitants of Figuig on the Moroccan side and Arjah on the Algerian side were subjected to reciprocal controls and expulsions, generating high tension for more than a month, which could have led to a mini armed conflict, until the situation returned to normal.
The Western Sahara issue, on the other hand, has for decades brought the two neighbours to the point of no return.
Morocco, on the basis of historical data and the proven legal relations of the populations of the territory of the former Spanish colony with the Royal Palace in Rabat, argues that Western Sahara has always been part of the Alawite kingdom, and accepts, as a solution proposed by Mohammed VI to the United Nations, that the native population and those living there should enjoy an advanced autonomous status that allows them to manage their natural wealth, their economy and their cultural and social development.
Algeria, citing the international rules adopted by the United Nations after the Second World War on the decolonisation of territories - Western Sahara was a Spanish province until 1975 - argues that only the organisation of a referendum on self-determination that includes the option of total independence of the territory is valid to close the decolonisation chapter, thus forcing the Polisario Front movement, which disputes its sovereignty with the Kingdom of Morocco, to close itself off to any other option. The Polisario cannot decide on its own, on pain of being repudiated by its guardians, which would mean its dissolution and would seriously affect the survival of the minority Sahrawi population living as refugees in its territory.
As things stand, neither Morocco nor Algeria are going to back down; they cannot, nor do they want to. What is in it for both sides? Rabat, to advance in its goal of completing the historical sovereignty of its territory. And Algiers, to wear down and harass its geopolitical rival, and to create a hypothetical strategic alliance between Algeria, the Republic of a "free Sahara" and Mauritania, in order to provoke the implosion of the neighbouring kingdom through exhaustion.
The recent episode of the visit of US Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley to Morocco is an example of the tense situation in the region. Mark Milley, who described the Alawite kingdom as a "partner and great ally" of the US, characterised Morocco as "a stable country in a continent and a region in search of stability". Two days later, this provoked an exacerbated reaction from the Algerian army chief of staff, General Said Chengriha, who, from the headquarters of the Fourth Military Region's General Staff in Ouargla, thundered against the top US military representative and adviser to President Joe Biden, presenting Algeria as an oasis of stability in a troubled and troubled region. According to General Chengriha, "our whole environment is unstable", referring to Morocco, and "Algeria acts as a stabilising factor in the region, contributing to the development of its neighbours".
These assertions echo those made a year ago in Algiers by President Abdelmadjid Tebboune in the presence of US foreign minister Antony Blinken, who claimed that "all our borders are on fire, with the exception of Tunisia", even going so far as to judge Mauritania as incapable of defending its own security, almost like a failed state.
Said Chengriha, who together with Abdelmadjid Tebboune forms the binary pole of power in Algeria, responded directly to General Mark Milley by stating that "Algeria, despite vain attempts to discredit its role and position on the continent, remains an important factor in the African equation and a major player in its vital space".
The verbal clash between Generals Chengriha and Milley shows a certain degree of nervousness within the Algerian power, which is evidence that the recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, made by President Donald Trump and not reversed by his successor Joe Biden despite strong pressure from the Algerian lobby in Washington, has created a new strategic balance of power in northwest Africa and the Western Mediterranean region. This, together with the Abraham Accords, is isolating the Algiers regime, which is finding it increasingly difficult to mobilise its classic allies, Russia, China and South Africa, which are more willing to reach 'pragmatic agreements' with Morocco than to confront the Kingdom of Mohammed VI.
Rabat still has an ace up its sleeve, which it will pull out when the conditions are right. It is the question of the Eastern Sahara, an important part of south-western Algeria today, covering more than 700,000 square kilometres and harbouring considerable subsoil wealth. According to Maghrebi and French historians, geographers and specialists, this region, which historically belonged to the Alaouite kingdom, was incorporated into the French Departments of colonial Algeria during the French Protectorate in Morocco. In anticipation of the inevitable Moroccan detachment from Parisian tutelage, the French state placed this region of the Eastern Sahara as part of its Departments in Algeria.
The Eastern Sahara includes several important towns, such as Tindouf and Bechar, and strategic deposits such as the iron ore at Gara Djebilet. In 1972 Algeria and Morocco signed an agreement for the exploitation of these deposits, which have reserves estimated at 3.5 billion tonnes of iron, half of which are exploitable. The agreement was never put into practice, but recently the Algerian state has signed a series of agreements with Chinese companies for the exploitation of these deposits, effectively breaking and burying the agreement signed with Morocco.
Faced with this situation, the Royal Palace in Rabat has decided to dust off the issue of the Eastern Sahara, which is beginning to become topical. A fortnight ago, the director of the Moroccan Royal Archives, Bahija Simou, declared that "there is a significant number of archives showing Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara and also over Eastern Sahara", archives that the director declared to be "at the disposal of researchers to examine and study".