Taliban, Al-Qaeda and ISIS-K relations: a collaborative path to action against Daesh?
Afghanistan is once again on the front pages of the media, bringing three major players to the table on the Afghan and international stage. A puzzle consisting of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Daesh, all Sunni Salafists, but with a series of differences that lead to confrontation. One of the main differences lies in territorial ambition: while the Taliban limit their area of control to Afghanistan and certain areas in Pakistan, focusing on Pashtun territories, the terrorist organisations aspire to a worldwide caliphate, whether or not the regions are mainly infidel (Dar al-Harb) or Muslim (Dar al-Islam).
The first piece of the puzzle is the Taliban, who have been known as such since the late 1990s, more specifically in 1994. The Soviet invasion (1979) and the establishment of the socialist government after the Saur Revolution (April Revolution), a year earlier in 1978, set the stage for the sedition of the conservative sectors and the reaction of the United States. Operation Cyclone was thus covertly launched, in which both the US and Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan financed and supplied arms to the so-called "freedom fighters". A bloody period ensued, leading to the Soviet withdrawal in 1988.
After the withdrawal of the USSR, a civil war engulfed the country, with the establishment of a coalition government that included the Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara and other minority ethnic groups, leaving aside the then predominant Pashtun ethnic group. The Taliban, established as such in 1994 in Kandahar, presented themselves to Afghan society as the fighters for peace, made up of mujahideen of Pashtun origin who had fought against the Soviets, as well as students from Pakistani madrassas. Consolidated with the help of the United States, they fought to seize power in the country.
Born in the south of the country, they managed to become popular in the area by moving up towards Kabul, finally taking it in 1996 through the use of artillery obtained during the past war period. This resulted in the public annihilation of the hitherto leaders of the government.
After its implementation with the Sharia as a guide, the impositions came, according to them based on a pure Islamism as it was based on primitive tribal beliefs, such as the prohibition of music, female education and the compulsory burqa, and long beards for men; in most cases, the death penalty was imposed as a consequence of non-compliance.
In the aftermath of 9/11, the US invaded Afghanistan and drove the Taliban out of the capital, not by defeating them but by moving them eastwards towards the Pakistani border, which facilitated their main source of funding: the opium trade and the exploitation and sale of minerals. At the same time, thanks to the Bonn Agreements, the new Afghan government was consolidated, made up of different ethnic groups and clans, including the Pashtuns, leaving aside, of course, the Taliban.
On the other hand, Al-Qaeda, born on Pakistani territory, but also the result of the fight against the Soviets in the 1980s. This organisation received mujahideen from different countries in its homeland, including Taliban, who were willing to fight against the oppressive troops of Islam in Afghanistan, receiving a prior Salafist education, of a Wahhabi style, with the Sharia as a basis.
Because of this influx of Taliban, the links between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are obvious, both in the supply of human and logistical capital. It is estimated that the Afghan-Pakistan border is home to around 400 members of Al-Qaeda Central.
And thirdly Daesh, in the Afghan case ISIS-K (Islamic State of Khorasan). An organisation born as a split from Al-Qaeda, it is consecrated as an enemy of the Taliban, emerged on the border with Pakistan in the year 2014-2015 by separatist mujahideen of the Afghan Taliban and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Taliban lineage in Pakistan, dissatisfied with the methodology and lack of rigorousness in their Islamist ideology. A struggle continues between the Taliban and Daesh for the appropriation of fighters from the opposing side, as a way of increasing their power in jihadism in the area.
The key to understanding the curious rivalry of these three Sunni Salafist groups is territorial and strategic ambition. ISIS-K reproaches the Taliban's mediation and contact with the United States as a sign of betrayal by collaborating with the enemy (Doha Accords); on the other hand, while the Taliban focus solely on control of Afghan soil and certain Pakistani areas, both Daesh and Al-Qaeda aspire to global expansion, something that for the "mother" organisation is not a problem due to the ties of friendship it has with the Taliban, being fully compatible with its purposes.
The crux of the matter is who is the greater focus of concern here at the international level. At the national level, none of the three characters to be considered is positive, however, at the international level, Taliban proactivity, as far as international collaboration or relationship is concerned, can be a very positive point to annihilate the Daesh faction in the area being, as already stated in this paper, their enemy. However, as I mentioned in my previous article on Al-Qaeda's strategic victory over Daesh, the methodology carried out by the former's parent organisation in the face of its split may have left it in the background today in terms of media spotlight, but it has gained significantly in terms of the transnational networks it has established. Just as the Taliban once offered shelter to Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, it would not be at all surprising if this chain of favours and collaboration were to continue to be repeated by both sides. In case ISIS-K were to wage open war to take control of Afghanistan or at least part of it, the joint fight between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda would be decisive. In addition, the Haqqanai Network, one of the most dangerous militias in the country, is one of the Taliban's most dangerous militias, which shares beliefs and ambitions with Da'esh and is willing to join the fight.
With the Doha agreement between the United States and the Taliban on 29 February 2020, the US government committed itself, on the one hand, to the withdrawal of its troops in Afghanistan, present since the GWOT after 9/11, and on the other hand, to the withdrawal of sanctions imposed on Taliban leaders, all in exchange for a Taliban commitment not to allow the establishment of any organisation or individuals that threaten the security of the United States and its allies, including Al-Qaeda or Daesh. The negotiations also included inter-Afghan talks to achieve a ceasefire for the political future of the country as well as the release of up to 5,000 prisoners, according to the BBC, and 1,000 Afghan government officials held by the Taliban.
These agreements, far from bringing about a period of peace, have reopened the wound, placing the country in one of the worst imaginable scenarios, in addition to the dire situation in which its population has been plunged. The possibility of reinforcement of both Al-Qaeda and ISIS-K has multiplied, the latter being the perfect destination for those Taliban or Islamists who demand more radical fundamentalism from the Taliban or even greater territorial ambitions and against the distant enemy.
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