The United States at the centre

One of the most important miscalculations Vladimir Putin made with his decision to invade Ukraine was his failure to properly assess the consequences of the war on the US leadership and its role as the central great power. If he intended to weaken it, which was a goal in itself, the result has been the exact opposite. The National Security Strategy document released by the White House on 12 October sets out the broad outlines of US policy to position American interests on a global stage based on the internal and economic rejuvenation of its democracy and the strengthening of alliances and coalitions with other democracies and governments that contribute to the consolidation of an international order, respectful of the rules for managing competing interests and the advancement of human rights and diversity. A strategy that integrates the two traditional foreign visions, realist and liberal, that has waited patiently in Washington's offices for the war in Ukraine to show the world explicitly and painfully over the last few months the wisdom of American approaches.

While Russia struggles between a partial military defeat or a comprehensive moral defeat and the Chinese Communist Party prepares to re-elect without conviction a Xi Jinping atrophied by his untenable position of supporting Putin's unjustifiable invasion, the Americans offer the vast majority of countries and cultural realities the possibility of building an order where different interests can be brought together to confront global problems. The common good. In a space of cooperation where the United States does not hide its objectives to maintain its leadership, but which is open to diplomacy and negotiation, to the regulation of the digital environment, the fight against climate change and energy reconfiguration, and to comprehensive security that includes health and food. And of course the fight against the destabilisers of the web of sovereign states and powers, whose common goal is progress, not regression, as manifested in the war in Ukraine.

The US security strategy for the next decade acknowledges the reality of a world of great power competition, but reinforces the conviction and capacity of American democracy to lead it. The document's primary targets are the Americans themselves, who are placed at the centre of the goals. To improve their education, to relocate some of their investments in the country (semi-drivers), to upgrade their energy and environmental setting, and to reaffirm their democratic and liberal values. The next targets are Russia and the Chinese Communist Party. The former to warn it of a firm response to any confrontation. The latter, to reach out to it to collaborate on global issues (climate, health), but always within a framework that is neither invasive of third countries nor aggressive towards the fundamental structures of international relations accepted by most actors (sovereignty, borders, security on maritime routes, progress, human rights). Taiwan appears explicitly, as do Tibet, Hong Kong and the Uighurs. But not to stake out a position but to expose some of the weaknesses of the only autocracy capable of rivalling the United States globally.

European and NATO allies remain at the forefront of attention and demand for engagement to address objectives seen as common. The web of alliances and organisations in the Indo-Pacific region follows suit, now more permeable to collaboration with Western ones. The Middle East, without intervention objectives once reconfigured in a new dynamic of common projects, vigilant with Iran. The document insists on progress in nuclear non-proliferation. Latin America, in the sphere of a peaceful and non-disruptive Western hemisphere. And Africa as an emerging territory, with great possibilities for investment, which is part of the globality of the US vision. For Spain, good prospects for an ally and partner such as the United States, engaged in Atlantic security in both the North and the South. And therefore in need of firm and coordinated support from solvent and consolidated democracies.