Iraq continues to suffer the consequences of its recent past.
Iraq's history, dominated by internal and external wars, culminated in 2003 with the unilateral invasion of the country by a US-led coalition. In the late 1990s the consensus on Iraq in the UN Council was broken, reactions against the civilian consequences of sanctions began to spread, and Saddam Hussein's regime was slowly breaking out of its regional and international isolation. All of this caused the United States to become concerned and, far from changing its policy against Iraq, it shifted even more towards unilateralism and the direct exercise of force.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was initially part of the same strategy of survival and search for leadership that had motivated the aggression against Iran in 1988, accentuated by the difficult domestic economic situation and the growing social unrest brought about by the ruin of the long war with Iran. But a number of factors made this conflict very different: the aggression was directed at an Arab country, it endangered the pro-Western oil-producing region par excellence, and it took place at a time when the international order was being decisively changed by the collapse and ultimate collapse of the USSR. Saddled with civilian and military debts that amounted to the size of the country's annual budget, the Iraqi state entered the 1990s bankrupt.
In July 1990, Saddam Hussein claimed that Kuwait had been "stealing" Iraqi oil by extracting it from the Rumayla subsoil since 1980 and demanded compensation. Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait was aimed not only at oil and finance, but also at gaining access to the sea in the Gulf, which was essential for the development of his oil industry. The first phase of the conflict, between 17 January and 23 February 1991, centred on massive bombing of Iraq's military and economic potential and the troops stationed in Kuwait.
On the US and Western sides, there was no shortage of religious references, and the discourse spread around the idea that the war was a "crusade" of Western civilisation in defence of democracy. The US moved a huge diplomatic offensive, which was embodied in 12 UN resolutions providing for the imposition of sanctions. The first issue is that the sanctions were initially intended as a short-term penalty to force Kuwait's withdrawal. But the Security Council's decision to maintain the embargo has had devastating effects on Iraqi society. Between 1990 and 2000 the mortality rate among the Iraqi population became the highest in the world. As a result, the UN Security Council implemented the 'Oil for Food' programme, whereby the Iraqi government was allowed to sell a percentage of its oil to finance imports of food and other essential humanitarian goods.
In the late 1990s the consensus on Iraq in the UN Council was broken, reactions against the civilian consequences of the sanctions began to spread, and Saddam Hussein's regime was slowly breaking out of its regional and international isolation. All of this caused the US to become concerned and, far from modifying its harsh policy against Iraq, it shifted even more towards unilateralism and the exercise of force.
Once the war was over, Iraq was placed under a trusteeship regime under permanent control for an unspecified period. After the liberation of Kuwait, the UN put in place a system of sanctions on Iraq without determining when and under what conditions they would be lifted. The UN served as a framework and instrument for concerted action made possible by exceptional circumstances, but played no role as an actor in the war. Security Council decisions did not lead to the implementation of any UN-mandated operational arrangements. In fact, the Security Council only provided legitimacy for the attack, but it was the US that monopolised control of the military operation and the decision as to when it would end.
Operation Desert Fox, launched between 16 and 19 December, opened the door to dissent in the UN Security Council, which was accentuated by the subsequent US policy of acting outside the UN framework, launching continuous low-intensity bombing, reinforcing the no-fly zones and renewing its support for Iraq's political and armed opposition to Saddam Hussein's regime. Thereafter, official US discourse focused more than ever on the need to force regime change in Iraq and the Clinton Administration promoted the implementation of the Iraq Liberation Act in response to growing pressure in Congress and among Republicans to establish a pro-American government in Baghdad that would be responsive to US interests in the Middle East. And until that happened Iraq would not be reintegrated into the international community or relieved of sanctions.
The Bush Administration began its term in office by ordering an intense bombing of Iraq on 16 February 2001 that went beyond the southern no-fly zone and reached Baghdad. The US and its British ally were almost isolated in this new war offensive, condemned by the international community. What Bush called a "routine operation", Russia, France and China denounced as a violation of international law and UN Security Council resolutions, followed by many other countries. But in the Arab world it provoked a wave of anger and frustration, given that the second Palestinian Intifada had begun a few months earlier and was being repressed by the Israeli government with US support. Saddam Hussein benefited from this in the eyes of Arab and Muslim opinion and sentiment.
Against this backdrop, Russia threatened to use its veto because it saw the US-British proposal as consolidating the principle of sanctions rather than moving towards their lifting through the disarmament process. France tried to minimise the extension of international control over the Iraqi economy and proposed a series of more flexible measures that were not accepted, and China began to express its opposition more clearly. The US inability to re-establish international consensus on Iraq in line with its positions, and the realisation that the maintenance of the southern exclusion zone and its bombing were self-depleting and economically costly, increased the Bush Administration's determination to act alone to end Saddam Hussein's rule. Differences within the US administration were limited only to the choice of method to achieve this end. The most conservative advocated military intervention, while others were more reticent, believing that internal conspiracy within the Iraqi regime should be encouraged in order to promote a military coup d'état. The attack on New York and the Pentagon on 11 September temporarily interrupted the implementation of this objective. However, the alteration of international relations that the attack brought about in favour of the US did not alter the lack of consensus in the UN Security Council on the question of what to do about Iraq. But US politicians in favour of military invasion saw the proclamation of the war on terror as an opportunity to deal the final blow to Saddam Hussein.
The eruption of 11 September provided an excuse to defend the campaign against Iraq. US officials combined arguments of security, humanitarianism and defence of democratic values: that Saddam Hussein's regime possessed weapons of mass destruction that threatened world security, and that the regime had links to Al-Qaeda, which made it a target of the war on terror, as Afghanistan had been. In the eyes of the world, this decision to end the threat posed by Saddam Hussein meant the need to preserve world peace, to put an end to a despotic regime that was averse to Western interests and democratic values, the consecration of preventive war to neutralise hostile governments with weapons of mass destruction, the duty to ensure access to the energy resources of the region... September 11 was a great tactical victory for the enemies of the United States. Osama bin Laden hoped that attacking the US would put pressure on US leaders to stop supporting Middle Eastern regimes. He believed that without US support Arab regimes would collapse and be replaced by fundamentalist governments. The cultural and religious aspect was to become the instrument with which to morally justify world reconstruction, which the US aspired to preside over in the face of Western action outside its borders. The formula was as follows: if the explanation of what is happening is based above all on an anti-Western cultural and religious determinism, the responsibilities of Western political and military action abroad can be avoided.
The Gulf War was the staging of this new order. It not only represented US supremacy in the world but was also used to consolidate the self-legitimisation of Western supremacy vis-à-vis the Others. What was particularly the fight against a particular dictator in a particular Arab country became a global crusade against Islam in an essentialist conception that was very useful in establishing the fundamental lines of Western policy in the region. The framework of Islam is thought to constitute a stagnant world that fixes its societies in the past and regression as if it alone determined the future of these peoples.
As we have seen, the end of Gulf War I on 28 February 1991 was supposed to bring an end to the conflict between Iraq and the US-led coalition. In the years that followed, the United States and its allies repeatedly used limited force against Iraq, maintained sanctions and embargoes, conducted sometimes intrusive inspections of Iraq's WMD and missile programmes, supported the anti-Saddam opposition and sought to isolate and weaken the Baghdad regime. In addition, since December 1998, the US and Britain have carried out sustained, albeit reduced, bombing of some Iraqi targets. Among other major powers, only Britain strongly supported the Americans, while France, Russia and China strongly criticised the situation, claiming that the actions taken were infective and unjust.
The ultimate goal in 2002, however, was already regime change, either through a military coup or through an invasion justified as a "pre-emptive strike" against a rogue state engaged in developing and deploying weapons of mass destruction, although it was also open only to getting Saddam Hussein to agree to cooperate with inspections and disarmament. However, direct US access to oil and the profits of US oil companies alone are not enough to explain US interests in the Middle East.
In reality, the issue is much more complex, for while the attack was a triggering event, the real causes are mired in a tangle of reasons of a very different nature that we generically refer to as strategic "interests". The war in Iraq was already clearly in the minds of an ideological sector of the US ruling class and the passions of the people were ready to be inflamed after the attacks.