The ideology of the Majdalists, followers of a Salafist Muslim doctrine, could complicate efforts to resolve the conflict plaguing the North African nation

The rise of the Majdalists in the Libyan puzzle

photo_camera AFP/MAHUMD TURKIA - Buildings in the Libyan capital, Tripoli, during the bombing reported by Marshal Khalifa Haftar's forces on 9 May 2020

Libya is a fragmented state, devastated by conflict and in chaos since the fall of dictator Muammar Qaddafi. The North African nation is the victim of a war of both political and religious legitimation; a war that has destroyed the lives of thousands and thousands of people and that has attracted the attention of great powers such as Turkey and Russia because of its oil deposits. The authorities in the east led by General Jalifa Haftar control most of the country and since April 2019 have been trying to extend their power in the regions still in the hands of the Government of National Accord (GNA), presided over by Fayez Sarraj. 

Haftar is supported by Russia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, while the Tripoli government, backed by the Muslim Brotherhood and internationally recognized by the United Nations, receives military aid from Turkey and Qatar. The West is largely unaware of the religious movements that exist in North Africa, as well as their historical and political role. In the complicated Libyan scenario, the current within quietist Salafism known as Madjalism has been gaining importance throughout the country, increasing its influence in key religious institutions or in certain armed groups. 

Daños después del bombardeo del aeropuerto Mitiga de Trípoli

The ideology of the Madjalists, followers of an ultraconservative Muslim Salafist doctrine originating in Saudi Arabia, could complicate efforts to resolve the Libyan conflict. The Madkhali current enjoys some popularity in the North African nation. Their particular type of ideology has made them allies in the fight against Daesh. Yet they have also been responsible for deepening the open wounds between the supporters and detractors of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Their doctrine has allowed them to go beyond tribal, ethnic and regional divisions. Therefore, they are probably the only ones who have been able to increase their influence throughout the country, and to ally themselves with local authorities on the different sides of the conflict, both in the GNA and the LNA. However, for their critics, talking about this doctrine is the same as talking about extremism. Its detractors denounce that they are implementing an agenda to transform society and warn that they are using state religious institutions to "spread their ultraconservative dogma" as a strategy to impose new cultural and social norms. 

While the clashes between the Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Government of National Accord (GNA) continue, another struggle is taking place in the west of the country behind the backs of much of the international community. On 30 April, a group of rebels forced the closure of the local office of the General Authority for Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs (Awqaf) of the GNA in the town of Zawiya. Three days later, the town of Khoms followed suit, while in nearby Zliten, as well as in other towns in the country, such offices were gradually being closed down. A day earlier, the Grand Mufti of Libya, Sheikh Sadiq al-Ghariani, appeared on television condemning the Awqaf and accusing it of being "loyal to the enemy" and of "following the path of Al-Madkhali". 

Rabee bin Hadi al-Madkhali (el fundador del movimiento madjalismo)

By these words, Ghariani was referring to those Salafists who adhere to the teachings of the Saudi cleric, Sheikh Rabee bin Hadi al-Madkhali, and who are branded as Mahalists by their detractors. During his speech, the Libyan Shaikh went so far as to accuse this movement of working for "the Saudi intelligence services", according to the digital Middle East Eye. These statements highlight the polarity of a region that is represented in the headlines of the rest of the world by the name of Haftar or Fayez Sarraj. The Majdalists are present in some of the main militias fighting in the country, both in the east and the west, and exercise considerable military and political influence over both rival governments.

In Tripoli, fighters loyal to this doctrine play a key role in the militias that collaborate with the internationally recognized National Accord Government. An analysis by the International Crisis Group think tank has concluded that this group "exercises significant influence over some of its key facilities and institutions" and even provides them with protection. But their presence goes much further. The Majdalists are also an essential part of the Libyan National Army (LNA), which has been able to take advantage of the spiral of instability in which Libya is caught up in order to take control of important religious institutions. 

Combatientes de un grupo armado con base en Misurata

Its rise comes at the same time as the military escalation in Libya is intensifying following the agreement signed last November between Turkey and the Tripoli-based National Accord Government (NAG) led by Fayez Sarraj. Within the framework of this security and economic cooperation agreement, Ankara has intensified its presence in Libya, sending hundreds of mercenaries and dozens of shipments of military material. This agreement has further poisoned diplomatic relations between Turkey and the countries of this region, so much so that a few weeks ago the foreign ministers of Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, France and the United Arab Emirates denounced in an official statement the "continuing illegal activities" by Turkey in this area. 

In the conflict in Libya, the religious dispute adds to the control over resources that makes this civil war can be understood as a war for oil. Since the appearance of black gold in the 19th century, this resource has become the main source of income in the economy of the North African nation. Before the conflict conquered every corner of the country, hydrocarbon resources in Libya represented up to more than 70 percent of the national income. This situation changed completely with the death of Gaddafi and later with the appearance of Haftar in this complicated scenario. Since then, the leader of the LNA has managed to gain control of some of the country's main oil fields, a development that powers such as Turkey have not fully accepted. 

The mafias and other organized crime groups have taken advantage of this context to increase and exercise their presence. The poverty and food insecurity, corruption or weakness that characterize this Sahel state are some of the threats that have been installed at the gates of Europe (in what is known as an advanced European security border), putting at risk the security of neighboring countries, an issue that worries the old continent with the constant arrival of refugees. To these events we must add the multidimensional crises caused by terrorism and transnational organized crime. This situation is exacerbated by the porosity of the Sahelian borders and the structural insecurity present in the region.  All this has favoured the emergence of a war economy that mainly perpetuates the existence of unarmed state groups and organised crime.

Miembros del Ejército Nacional Libio (LNA), comandados por Khalifa Haftar en Bengasi
Beyond the religious sphere 

The roots of the doctrine of the Madjalists are synonymous of revolution. It was 2011, when North Africa and the Middle East became involved in what months later would become known as the Arab Spring. Since then, the Salafist current has been spreading throughout Libya and slowly and quietly making its way into mosques, schools and the media. A citizen of the city of Zawiya told the Middle East Eye that he estimates that the followers of this religious doctrine control at least 80 percent of the mosques in this city. "The Salafists have total control in some areas of Tripoli, and their sheikhs have total control of the mosques," he said. Beyond the religious sphere, the Majdalists have been gaining ground in various security bodies, according to an official interviewed by MEE who stressed that "they have taken over Misrata, Tripoli, Sabratha, Zawiya, Zliten, and Khoms. The growth of this ideological current in its various aspects and manifestations has raised great concern among other Islamist doctrines, such as Sufism or those associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Fotografía de archivo del ex presidente de Libia, Muammar Gaddafi

The fragmentation that characterizes the Libyan state is also present in this ideological movement, which "has sought through the revolution to overthrow the old order and lead the transition according to its own vision and principles," according to the analysis made by the Middle East Eye.The willingness of the ANG to seek support in countries like Turkey or in Salafist oriented bodies such as the Special Deterrence Force (RADA) has set off alarm bells in the homes of all those who follow the famous Mufti. 

In this context, the analyst Alison Pargeter considers that the decision of the GNA to appoint the well-known Salafist Sheikh Mohamed Ahmeida al-Abbani as head of the Awqaf in November 2018 has opened a new wound in the conflict suffered by the North African nation. Abbani replaced Abbas Ghadi, an ally of Ghariani, who was forced to leave his position. "His appointment was the straw that broke the camel's back for many Islamist politicians and highlighted the growing power of Salafist ideology in Tripoli," Pargeter explains in her research. Once in power, Abbani made considerable changes such as removing the Sufi Sheikh Ahmed al-Kout from the Awqaf and appointing Mohamed Sassi Sharkasi. 

Musulmanes libios realizan la oración matutina del Eid Al-Adha en la Plaza de los Mártires de la capital, Trípoli, el 11 de agosto de 2019

"The Awqaf has a lot of land, buildings and money. Control of the Awqaf means controlling enormous financial resources. In addition, there are many lucrative positions on the boards of banks and financial institutions (such as Shariah compliance committees) for which the Awqaf has the right to nominate candidates," a citizen living in Zawiya City told the Middle East Eye web portal. For this reason, Abbani's appointment has been severely criticised by the opposition, which has repeatedly demanded that the Awqaf resign. 

In the same analysis, Alison Pargeter warns that the Salafist militias play a central role in the LNA forces and their support has been necessary to allow Haftar to take control of the east of the country. "Thanks to this relationship, the Salafists have been able to dominate the religious space in the east, where they control religious institutions and establishments, and can impose their interpretation of Islam," she said in an article published in the Middle East Eye. Furthermore, this doctrine plays a fundamental role in the offensive launched by Haftar last April to take control of Tripoli. Its importance is such that last January, a Salafist brigade opened the way for the LNA to take over the strategic city of Sirte. 

El primer ministro del Gobierno del Acuerdo Nacional (GNA) de Libia

The gap between these two ideological currents could lead to a war within the religious space of the nation. Although the Majdalists are not directly involved in politics, they are an important lobby for religion to play a greater role in public electoral life, as they have interpreted it in an investigation carried out by the International Crisis Group. 

In the complicated Libyan conflict, this movement has shown its open support for Haftar, leader of the Libyan National Army (LNA), who in April 2019 announced the beginning of an offensive to take control of the country's capital. In recent months, the LNA has been increasing its presence again, in part due to the support of Turkey, a nation criticized by a large part of the international community for sending military material and large contingents of mercenaries from Syria, in violation of the arms embargo imposed by the United Nations. 

Religious diversity in the country opens another breach in an already stratified and complex conflict
Unos muchachos libios leyeron el Corán

The European Eye on Radicalization divides Libyan Islamists into the mainstream Islamists (The Muslim Brotherhood), post-Jihadists (Veterans of the Libyan Group for Islamic Struggle), Salafist parties, and Quietist Salafists (Madkhalis). The current escalation of violence and insecurity has emptied the country's temples, including the few places of worship that exist for Catholics. In recent years they have shown concern for the safety of their faithful. The religious diversity in the country opens another crack in an already stratified and complex conflict. Following the assassination of Muammar Gaddafi, the Majdalists have found allies among the main forces in the conflict, a rapprochement that could not be understood without understanding the past of this doctrine. "Although Salafism emerged in Egypt in the 19th century as an anti-colonial Muslim revival movement, its theological roots lie in 18th century Wahhabism that originated in the Najd region of the Arabian Peninsula, in what is now Saudi Arabia," they have stressed in an investigation by the International Crisis Group. 

Today, this current is divided into three tendencies: scripturalist or "scientific" Salafism, a politically quietist current that opposes political participation; reformist Salafism, which is more politically committed and can take a revolutionary form; and jihadist Salafism of the kind embraced by al-Qaeda and Daesh. The Majdalist current has emerged in recent decades as a current that could be encompassed within scripturalist Salafism. "Madkhali followers have spread throughout the Arab world, in part thanks to the support of well-funded Saudi religious charities and access to satellite TV channels," they explain in the think tank mentioned above. 

This ideology came to Libya in the 1990s and thanks to those Libyans who had studied at institutions linked to Madkhali in Saudi Arabia or Yemen and then returned home. In the beginning, this doctrine was treated with suspicion, but with the passage of time its influence in the region increased. The International Crisis Group study estimates that by 2018 the Majdalists had become the largest Salafist movement in the country. 

Musulmanes sufíes libios cantan y tocan tambores durante una procesión para conmemorar el cumpleaños del Profeta Mahoma
In the east and in the west

The killing of several Salafis in Benghazi from mid-2013 to early 2014 was the last straw. Among the dead was Colonel Kamal Bazaza, a well-known imam who also worked in the Benghazi Security Directorate. Bazaza's death was the spark that ignited the Majdalists' decision to join Haftar's Operation Dignity in 2014. Over time they have managed to position themselves in the eastern branch of the General Authority for Religious Gifts and Islamic Affairs, the state agency that administers the mosques. In the east of the country they have been described as "the backbone" of this offensive. 

In the west, the Majdalists are part of a series of militias that are present in the west of the country, in particular in Sabratha, Surman and Zawiya, as well as in many of the Anti-Crime Units (Mukafahat al-Kareema, under the Ministry of the Interior), according to the International Crisis Group study. The most important body in which supporters of this doctrine are present is the Special Deterrence Force (Quwat al-Radaa al-Khaasa, commonly known as Radaa). 

Una vista general muestra los escombros de un santuario sufí dañado en el barrio de Tajoura

"The key to the Libyan debate on the rise of the Majdalists is the question of how the movement can evolve, as the current environment in Libya is likely to encourage ambitions far beyond the seemingly quietist roots of the ideology. This prospect alarms several senior figures in the North African nation's security sector, as some see Madkhali's Salafism as a key challenge to the stabilisation of the country, both now and in the future," have said the researchers in charge of the analysis at International Crisis Group. 

In 2014, Libya was condemned to live with its back to the wall. The political division that emerged in the middle of this year led to the emergence of two governments, one eastern and one western. One consequence of this division has been the creation of several parallel state institutions based in eastern Libya and duplicating those already created by the Sarraj government. The Majdalists have made efforts in recent years to take control of these religious institutions. 

Manifestantes sostienen pancartas y la bandera salafista

In this spiral of uncertainty, those responsible for finding a political solution to the Libyan conflict have to take into account the presence of this Salafist movement. "The presence of the Madjalists in militias with varying degrees of legitimacy throughout the country has enabled them to pursue an ultra-conservative agenda aimed at transforming society. While some praise their apparent integrity and willingness to tackle crime and fight the Daesh, the Madjalists are increasingly feared by some groups in society such as civil society activists, Sufis, the Amazigh minority and members of the Muslim Brotherhood," International Crisis Group has noted. Their current influence on the North African nation raises questions about their impact on Libya's political and social future.

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