Historical explanation of the fact that certain islets off the coast of North Africa belong to Spain

Las plazas de soberanía española en el Mediterráneo

photo_camera AFP/FADEL SENNA - A photograph taken from the Moroccan town of Fnideq shows a general view of the enclave of Ceuta

The battle between Western Sahara and Morocco has reopened the issue of the Spanish sovereignty in North Africa.

However, apart from the typical cities of Ceuta and Melilla, what other enclaves in the Mediterranean are under Spanish control? These enclaves, known as ''plazas de soberanía'' or "sovereign strongholds", are the islands and rocks off the coast of North Africa, which continue to be maintained due to their enormous geostrategic importance. These are: The Chafarinas Islands, the Alborán Island, the Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera, the Alhucemas Islands and the Perejil Island.  But since when, how and why do they belong to the Spanish state?

The Constitution makes no reference to these territories, except for the so called “major places of sovereignty" - Ceuta and Melilla -, the rest are not mentioned in the Statutes of Autonomy. Except for the Alborán Island, which belongs to the municipality of Almeria, the other territories are in a "legal limbo". On his side, Morocco relentlessly claims the sovereignty over these enclaves, included the two autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla.

This article will briefly review why these strongholds of sovereignty belong to the Kingdom of Spain. Although the Hispanic presence in the Maghreb is very prolonged, this article will only cover events from the Catholic Kings (15th century).

1. The Catholic Monarchs (1492-1516)

At the end of the 15th century, the conquest of the Maghrebi coast by the Catholic Monarchs began, starting what the Islamic historiography has called 'The War of the Three Hundred Years'. This long-lasting and constant war of attrition between Christians and Muslims comprises the period between 1497 and 1782, when the conquered territories constantly switched from the hands of Christians and Muslims.

The conquest was driven by religious, defensive and economic reasons. The Catholic Monarchs were determined to expel the Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula, and to continue the conquest of North Africa as the last phase of the Reconquista. Firstly, Queen Isabella I of Castile wanted to recover 'Hispania Transfretana', the territories belonging to the Roman province 'la Baetica' which were located on the other side of the Strait of Gibraltar. Secondly, Isabella wanted to avenge Christianity for the capture of Constantinople in 1453 by the Ottomans. The queen fantasized about advancing along the southern shore of the Mediterranean, occupying Egypt and reconquering the Holy Places. To achieve this goal, the so-called "war against the Moor" of the 15th and 16th centuries was ignited by the epic and glorious spirit that surrounded it. It was believed that a Christian had to go to fight against the infidel in order to magnify his faith, regardless of whether the campaign was against Moors, Arabs or Turks (De Bunes, 1995). By means of Papal bulls, Alexander VI, the Spanish pope of the Borgia family, granted the conquest of Africa to the Catholic Monarchs, and turned it into a crusade, a "holy" enterprise. It was the Pope himself who gave the title of 'Catholic Monarchs' to the kings of Spain, and supported the war with funding.

Next was the defense concerns. For centuries, the Maghreb had been the main source of military threats to the Iberian Peninsula. That is why the Catholic Monarchs wanted to dominate both coasts of the Strait of Gibraltar in order to defend the Spanish kingdoms from future attacks, as well as to guarantee safe trading routes along the Mediterranean.

The last motives are found in a Spanish nobility athirst for greatness, adventure and copious spoils, as well as the need to entertain a military and political class that had lost its importance with the end of the Reconquista. The urban and commercial classes also pressured for new markets, more resources and to be able to take advantage of the African gold caravans crossing the Sahara. Finally, the ‘parias’ (tribute paid by Muslim communities to Christians kingdoms) were a good source of income.

Interestingly, the conquest of North Africa, at this time, was carried out using a medieval strategy. The lack of funds from the Spanish crowns after the War of Granada forced the conquest through the system called "King's fifth", where noblemen or lords formed and financed troops to conquer overseas territories, no arms, men or money from the monarchy was used. This was the same system used to conquer America. For example, the conquest of Melilla was financed by the Duke of Medina Sidonia, and executed by his navy captain, Pedro Estupiñán, on September 17th 1497. Over the years, due to the lack of economic and military means to preserve Melilla, the Duke handed over the island as a heritage for the Catholic Kings. In 1508, under the command of Don Pedro Navarro, the Spanish conquered the Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera.

During these first centuries, Portuguese and Spanish endeavors stripped the Berber states –the modern states of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria - of their control over their coastal areas, since the main port cities were in Christian hands.

Atalayar_ España y sus Enclaves

Queen Isabella's death put at halt the vehemence of the "war against the Moor". Ferdinand the Catholic disregarded the conquest of the Maghreb, focusing on the Italian affairs, the conquest of America and his marriage policy. The African project was then reduced to the establishment of strategic positions, forming a fortified belt of citadels along the Maghrebi coast. These fortified enclaves were called 'presidios'.

Atalayar_ España y sus Enclaves
2. Charles I of Spain (1516-1556)

King Charles the I of Spain and V of Germany inherited 'la Berbería' or ‘the Barbary’, the string of ports along the African coast from Tripoli in the central Mediterranean, to Santa Cruz de Cabo Gue (Agadir) and the Canary Islands in the Atlantic. With it, he also inherited his grandmother’s crusade, who in her last will asked her daughter Juana to try to continue with the conquest of Africa and fighting Islam (De Bunes, 1995). Charles I’s objective in the Barbary was to conserve these territories and pass them on to his successor and heir. For this, he established a defense strategy through the control and containment of the Maghrebi coast.

As occurred under his grandfather Ferdinand’s mandate, Charles I attended the African affairs exclusively during the breaks granted on other fronts. That is why the activity in the Barbary was very discontinuous, and especially the military endeavor did not follow any planning. The emperor mostly turned his attention to the Maghreb for reasons of defense or prestige. For example, on October the 1st 1540, the battle of Isla de Alborán took place, a battle unleashed by the attack of Barbarossa (an Ottoman admiral) on Spanish territories, which ended with the crushing victory of the Spanish Navy and the annexation of the island.

The presidios, somewhat neglected by the crown, developed a close relationship with the Muslim tribes in order to survive. The Muslim tribes stocked the presidios in exchange for Christian protection against the Ottomans. Furthermore, the crown also invested in the creation of buffer states to make it more difficult for the Turks to conquer the presidios. 

Atalayar_ España y sus Enclaves

However, as the threat from the Ottoman Empire and its Berber allies became increasingly intense, the king Charles established for a short while the Barbary coast as the most important front against Istanbul, even above the open front along the Danube. The biggest fears were another Muslim invasion and the end of the Andalusian trade monopoly in the Mediterranean, established in 1490 by the Catholic Kings.

3. Philip II of Spain (1556-1598)

Philip II will continue in the same line as his grandfather and his father, defending, maintaining and fortifying the presidios, striving to stop Berber piracy and the Ottoman expansion.

However, under Philip II, the coast of North Africa became until the early 1980s the focus of the struggle against the Ottoman Empire. The Mediterranean became a bloodshed theatre, and for the first time since the Catholic Monarchs, numerous Spanish victories took place, such as the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. At the same time, there was a resurgence in the feelings of crusade against "the infidel".

For the first time, a powerful spy network was established throughout the North African region. "Rescuers, renegades, merchants, adventurers and ex-captives at the corsair bases and in Istanbul were in charge of organizing conspiracies and plots, sabotaging the enemy's infrastructures, reporting on military preparations, fleet departures, bribing high officials, attracting certain personalities to His Majesty's service, negotiating truces, peace or alliances" (Téllez Alarcia, 2000). Therefore, "the fight against the Turk" besides involving military activity, used espionage and diplomacy as other important tools of war. As examples of the usage of diplomacy are the alliances with the leaders of the area, such as the one with the Sultan Muley Abdullah, who, in 1560, transferred the islands of Alhucemas to the Spanish monarch in exchange for protection against the Ottomans.

During the last two decades of his mandate, Philip II definitively relegated the Barbary scene to the background. This does not mean that the African project was deactivated, the king continued with his efforts of preventing the newly emerging states to fall under the political influence of Istanbul. By the end of his reign, Philip consolidated his position as lord of the western Mediterranean, while the sultan was lord of the eastern Mediterranean.

Furthermore, with the annexation of Portugal to the kingdom of Spain in 1581, its overseas territories also came under the control of the monarch.  After Portugal’s independence, the nobles from Ceuta demanded to remain part of the kingdom of Spain. And in 1668, a treaty with Portugal recognized Spanish sovereignty over Ceuta and its jurisdiction, which included the island of Perejil.

Atalayar_ España y sus Enclaves
4. Isabella II of Spain (1833-1868)

By the beginning of the 19th century, after losing most of the American colonies, Spain ceased to be a great overseas empire. For this reason, Isabella II was resolved to regain the prestige of Spain, hence she launched military expeditions around the globe. The most important were the North African expeditions and the subsequent African War between 1859-1860 against Morocco. This political strategy was intended to imitate the other European powers of the time such as France and Italy in their conquests of the Maghreb and the unification of Spain, which had just suffered a civil war between the Isabelinos and the Carlists.

In 1848, the future General Serrano conquered the Chafarinas Islands and built a presidio there.

5. Conclusion

Most of the territories conquered in these centuries were lost, but these few enclaves that Spain maintains have little political and economic importance, however great strategic and defensive value to this day. They are crucial for the Spanish modern defense policies: they are used to control the Strait of Gibraltar; migratory flows; organized crime; maritime trade routes and the rest of dangers that may originate from the African continent. Interestingly, the Spanish policy with the Maghreb is the heir of Ferdinand the Catholic’s African policy established six centuries ago. 

REFERENCES

  1. De Bunes, M.A. (1995) La presencia española en el norte de África: las diversas justificaciones de la conquista en el Magreb. Aldaba: revista del Centro Asociado a la UNED de Melilla, nº. 25, (Ejemplar dedicado a: Estudios sobre presencia española en el norte de Africa), págs. 13-34
  2. Alonso, B. (2001) El norte de África en el ocaso del emperador (1549-1558). Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V. p. 387 - 414 (Volumen 1) https://repositorio.uam.es/bitstream/handle/10486/1213/17087_A21.pdf?sequence=1
  3. Téllez Alarcia, D. (2000) El papel del norte de África en la política exterior de Felipe II. La herencia y el legado. Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, Serie IV, H.ª Moderna, t. 13, págs. 385-420https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286165814_El_papel_del_norte_de_Africa_en_la_politica_exterior_de_Felipe_II_la_herencia_y_el_legado/fulltext/56668f5a08ae15e74634d26f/El-papel-del-norte-de-Africa-en-la-politica-exterior-de-Felipe-II-la-herencia-y-el-legado.pdf
  4.  Martínez Hoyos, F. (2019) La guerra de África: imperialismo de andar por casa. La Vanguardia. On-line: https://www.lavanguardia.com/historiayvida/historia-contemporanea/20191119/471723366845/guerra-marruecos-1859.html

 

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