What's behind the war between Daesh and al-Qaeda in the Sahel

Daesh officially confirms what some of its leaders have been unofficially admitting for weeks: the terrorist group is engaged in a "war" - as the jihadists themselves have described it - against the main branch of al-Qaeda in the Sahel. Over the past few months, the rural areas of southern Mali and northern Burkina Faso have been the scene of fighting that has intensified considerably in recent days.

Confirmation has come in a recent issue of Al-Naba, one of the magazines that Daesh regularly issues as part of its communication strategy. In one of its contents, the organisation blames the senior leadership of Al-Qaeda for having "started a war against the men of the Caliphate in the midst of a violent Crusader campaign".

From Al-Naba, they claim that the leaders of the Islam and Muslim Support Group (JNIM), the largest group in the area associated with the global Al-Qaeda network, "never miss an opportunity for betrayal". The accusations made by the publication's editors - and subsequently by Daesh's top leadership - are quite strong, as they also criticise JNIM for having lowered itself to "negotiate with the apostate government of Mali".

What reasons lie behind this escalation between the two giants of global jihadist terrorism? The truth is that the basis of the dispute is doctrinal, although it can also be seen from a more pragmatic point of view. Both sides are related to the latest developments in the security situation in the Sahel.

Before tackling the ideological debate that Daesh uses for entering into the battle against JNIM, it is worth taking into account some contextual data that allow us to see the situation more clearly.

The Western Sahel - specifically the area of the border between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, known as the Liptako-Gourma - is the geopolitical region of the world where jihadist terrorist activity has made the greatest progress in recent years, according to the conclusions of the latest report by the International Observatory for the Study of Terrorism (OIET). 

This rise is largely attributable to the two main groups operating in the region: the aforementioned JNIM and Daesh in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), located in the orbits of Al-Qaeda and Daesh, respectively. JNIM appeared in mid-2017 as an initiative to unify as many small terrorist entities in the area under one command as possible. It was joined by, inter alia, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Murabitun, the Macina Liberation Front (FLM) and Ansar Dine. The leader of the latter group, Iyad ag-Ghaly, became the leader of the new conglomerate.

ISGS, on the other hand, has been fed by fighters who, previously, had served in the organisations that now make up JNIM. Its leader is Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi. At the taxonomic level, JNIM is considered a subsidiary of a larger organisation, which is Daesh in the West African Province (ISWAP). 

Traditionally, tensions between JNIM and ISGS did not usually go beyond the occasional dispute over territorial dominance. In general terms, it was clear to both terrorist entities that there was a common enemy to defeat: the international troops deployed in the area - and mainly the French troops from operations Barkhane and Takuba - and the institutions of the different governments in the region.

What has changed? At the beginning of the year, Iyad ag-Ghaly admitted that he did not rule out the possibility of accepting Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita's invitation to participate in the so-called inclusive national dialogue with which the president wants to restore stability in his country. The terrorist leader admitted that the activity of his group had caused too many deaths. However, he pointed out as a precondition for joining the talks that all international troops should withdraw from Malian territory.

Despite the controversial statement, JNIM continued its activity and its campaign of attacks. Most analysts interpreted the movement as a search for a negotiated solution to a difficult situation, since international missions and the joint military force in the Sahel are increasingly putting pressure on the movements of terrorists. However, Daesh's leadership has preferred to see it as an unforgivable concession to the Malian executive. 

What has led Daesh to censor Ag-Ghaly's behavior so quickly and engage in open warfare against the group? A question of principle. At least, facing the gallery. 

The main doctrinal basis on which jihadist terrorist groups have based their activities is a theory known as takfirism. This current of thought, based in part on writings by medieval authors with Ibn-Taymiyya, was put into writing by the Egyptian thinker Sayyid Qutb in 1964 in a manifesto entitled 'Signs on the Path'.

In it, a very simple distinction was made between the Umma, the community of believers who lived according to the most restrictive interpretation of the Koran and the Hadith, and the 'jahiliya'. This Arab term, that can be translated as "ignorance" or "arrogance", designates, in few words, all that is not part of the Umma. In that mixed bag there are, of course, the non-Muslims.

Nevertheless, all those Muslims who do not agree with the ultraconservative Islam reflected in the Salafism are also included in that field. They are considered impure or 'takfir'. Thus, takfirism is the ideology that justifies the minor jihad -that which is interpreted as a holy war- including among its targets not only non-believers, but also Muslims who participate in a life model other than the one dictated by the Salafist. This includes states in the Arab world, as well as citizens who, for example, serve their public services or participate in their electoral processes.

This doctrine has been present in jihadist groups since the founding of Al-Qaeda in the late 1980s. Therefore, what Daesh argues is that, in the current case of Mali, JNIM has violated this fundamental theoretical principle of jihadism. The simple fact of recognising the state of Mali as a valid interlocutor constitutes, in the eyes of the most extremist, an unmitigated betrayal.

The recent publication by Al-Naba underlines this point. Its editors recall that, in the past, groups that currently make up JNIM already made pacts with "apostates", as they have been called since Daesh. They do not refer to any public administration, but to the organisations of Tuareg origin with which Al-Qaeda collaborated between 2012 and 2013 in the region of Azawad, in the north of Mali, in the separatist campaign that gave rise to the French Serval operation.

So, in short, it can be said that Daesh, at least as far as the western Sahel is concerned, has declared 'takfir' the main terrorist group associated with Al-Qaeda, even though it may seem counter-intuitive. However, JNIM is not the first jihadist group to contemplate entering into dialogue processes with state players. There is, for example, the case of the Taliban, who have reached an agreement with none other than the White House. The animosity towards Afghan extremists, however, does not reach the same levels.

It is worth asking, then, whether the dispute in the Sahel is really based solely on an ideological issue or whether the argument of takfirism is simply a pretext that Daesh is using to achieve concrete objectives of a different nature. The reality is probably somewhere in between: the principles have a certain weight, but the manoeuvre is not exempt from a certain dose of pragmatism. 

Why is that? Because the Takfirian theoretical basis can be exploited by Daesh to its advantage. Within the most radical Islamist groups - such as the communities where Salafist discourses are disseminated - the justification put forward by ISGS may be well received. In the specific context of the Sahel, where two similar entities are fighting each other, which one might be more attractive to a young man who is thinking of joining a jihadist group - one that has lowered itself to the level of a government that is branded an apostate, or another that denounces this betrayal and fights it on the ground? 

In terms of image, there is no doubt that Daesh, who has always been characterised by very successful communications campaigns aimed at recruitment, could benefit in the short and medium term in terms of recruiting new combatants.

In the long term, however, the story may be different. The opening options explored by Ag-Ghaly and JNIM also have their own pragmatic and realistic component. It seems that there is a future beyond continued combat with the security forces of the various countries in the area, even if, for the moment, it is only a trial run. ISGS, for its part, does not seem willing to go down that road, at least for the time being.

In any case, whether it is driven by principle or by more prosaic issues, the campaign of fighting that the two major terrorist groups have undertaken represents a further shock in one of the most unstable regions of the world. Although in the long run the infighting may weaken the two organisations, it is the local population that is already suffering in the midst of the fray. The situation of many civilians in the region continues to worsen and the horizon is far from clear.