Opinion

Draghi, the economic recovery and the problem of deadlines

photo_camera Mario Draghi

This past week, the President of the Italian Council of Ministers, Mario Draghi, presented to Parliament the Economic Recovery Plan that his government intends to implement in the coming months. The amount to be invested in the modernisation of the country is already known: 248 billion, of which 191.5 billion will come from the European Commission until 2026, plus a fund that will come from the Italian coffers and which will be added to the total amount. As expected, since these were the conditions of the European Reconstruction Fund approved in July last year, the spending priority will be directed towards the ecological transition (68.6 billion) and the digital transition (50 billion). Education, for its part, will receive 32 billion; 26 billion will be allocated to improving communication between the northernmost and southernmost parts of the country; and, finally, 22.4 billion for inclusion policies and 18.5 billion for territorial health. In addition, there is also a wide-ranging reform of the justice system, another aimed at the tax system (Draghi intends to do all of this without raising taxes, unlike neighbouring Spain) and another to modernise the increasingly stagnant administration.

The European Commission gave the "green light" to Draghi's request because it was convinced by the more than 40-page report, which went into maximum detail on the reasons for each economic item requested. This contrasted with what had been sent, a few months earlier, by the second Conte government, which was limited to a single sheet of paper riddled with vagueness. An issue that had been a determining factor for Matteo Renzi, who had been vilified to the point of exhaustion, to bring down the previous government: he did not want to be a party to the squandering of funds that were unique, given their amount, for the country. This opinion was shared by the President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella, and led him to ask Mario Draghi to take the helm of the Italian Executive while appealing to all parliamentary forces to support this new government. 

Once the money demanded has been obtained, Draghi's problem is basically one of deadlines. Because the reality is that the current legislature (the 18th in the history of the Italian Republic) has less than two years left to run, and the Roman banker and economist needs more than five years to be able to fully implement the entire plan presented. This is why the viability of what Prime Minister Draghi has brought to Parliament must be received with a certain scepticism, where he has only encountered the opposition of the Brothers of Italy of the also Roman Meloni and of the Cinque Stelle MPs who decided to split two and a half months ago from what had been their party.

In connection with this, Draghi is assured of only nine months: to be precise, until the end of January 2022. That is when Sergio Mattarella's presidential mandate expires, and the question is whether the political forces will decide that Mattarella's successor will be Draghi, which would change him from head of government to head of state. Or, in other words, he would go from governing to ensuring the viability and proper functioning of the institutions, a very different matter from what he is doing at the moment. 

If Draghi were to be elected President of the Republic, then it seems clear whom he would entrust to form a government: Daniele Franco, the current Minister of Economy and Finance. Franco is an old acquaintance of Draghi's: the two worked side by side when Mario Draghi was governor of the Bank of Italy, and by the time Draghi became the new prime minister, Franco was already director general of the Bank of Italy. So it would be a case of moving from one economist in the service of the state to another economist of the same type, thus guaranteeing continuity in economic policy and the management of funds.

Franco's problem, like Draghi's, is that he is an independent, and needs the support of a "maggioranza" of political parties outside his own party. In this sense, the vote of Matteo Salvini's Lega and the Cinque Stelle Movement is key: between them alone they have more than 140 votes in the Senate, just 21 short of an absolute majority (set at 161). And, of course, while Cinque Stelle's support seems fairly assured because it is a party that is ready for judgment and its MPs will want to use up the legislature because most of them will not be able to revalidate their seats, the situation is very different for Salvini and his party. It should be remembered that the party led by the politician from Lombardy has been leading in voting intentions since September 2018, and Salvini, who already knows what it is to be deputy prime minister, holder of the Interior portfolio, deputy, senator, MEP and even councillor (he began his career in 1993 as a member of the town council of the capital of Lombardy), only needs to preside over the Council of Ministers in his extensive political career. And, as expected, he will do everything he can to make this goal a reality.

Salvini currently supports the Draghi government, where he has three of his own as ministers, and has voted in favour of everything the premier wanted except the decree on opening hours and other activities because he disagreed on the seriousness of the so-called "health emergency". Now it is his turn to concentrate on the municipal elections ("administrative" is what they call them there), with the mayoralties of the country's three main cities at stake: Milan, in the north; Rome, in the centre; and Naples, in the southernmost part of the country. These elections will take place in September-October this year, and should not affect the stability of the Draghi government in any way because municipal politics is a world apart. However, when the year 2022 begins, what will be at stake will be the general elections, which must be held in March 2023 at the latest. And that is where Salvini is really at stake: secretary general of the Lega since December 2013, he has already been head of the ticket in 2018, so the next occasion will surely be his last chance to become the new prime minister.

Matteo Salvini

The problem is that Draghi's good management may work against Salvini's interests, because he has built his popularity on the existing malaise in society, while focusing all his attacks on the European Union: if the country begins to recover strongly thanks to European aid, then Salvini may see his voting intentions fall, which would force him to precipitate the fall of the existing government, whether it is presided over at that time by Draghi, Franco or someone else. Although it is true that the only two parties that really want to go to elections now (Salvini's and Meloni's) do not have enough votes together to leave the government in a minority: they would also need Cinque Stelle to leave the "maggioranza". Which is no pipe dream either, since Salvini could accommodate a few in his party and that is no small thing, so anything can happen.

The question is whether Draghi, assuming he is not elected president of the Republic and seeing that his plan begins to reap the desired fruits, can think of doing the same as two "premiers" who, like him, were also independent and decided to found their party to go to the next elections: that was precisely what Lamberto Dini did in 1996, after having been prime minister between 1995 and the time of the elections; and Mario Monti in 2013 after having also been president of the Council of Ministers between November 2011 and February 2013. Neither of them fared well: Dini failed to remain prime minister, giving way to a centre-left coalition governed by Romano Prodi, and neither did Mario Monti, enabling the centre-left to once again come to power under the Tuscan (from Pisa, to be precise) Letta, and with him up to three centre-left governments (in addition to Letta's, there was Renzi's between 2014 and 2016 and Gentiloni's between 2016 and 2018).

Draghi will probably not even think of being a candidate in the next elections, among other things because of his age and the trajectory he has behind him. Dini was 65 when he stood for election in 1996, and Monti was five years older (70) when he stood in 2013, but Draghi, in the event that the elections are held in March 2023, will be just a few months away from turning 76 (he was born in September 1947). And that is a very old age for an Italian politician who is currently very young; Conte was born in the sixties; Salvini, Renzi and Meloni in the seventies; and Di Maio and others in the eighties. And even more so for a man who has already been, consecutively, governor of the Bank of Italy, president of the European Central Bank and, finally, prime minister. The closest to Draghi is the former president of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani, but we shall see if he does not prefer to make way for the current minister, Mara Carfagna.

The reality is that Draghi, for the time being, has only ensured that he has vaccinated the entire population, but the economic recovery has only just begun. And, of course, whoever succeeds her at the head of the Council of Ministers, especially if he or she is a politician, will have his or her own idea of what to do with the funds that will continue to be received by that time. Draghi has achieved something unique, however, and that is the support of European institutions normally reluctant to give money to Europe's third largest economy because of how badly EU money has been mismanaged on many occasions (the fear that it will end up in the hands of the Mafia is a constant, although this is only partially true). From there, we will see what surprises this more than convoluted situation has in store for us. Draghi has already warned: "I will be at the helm of the executive for as long as Parliament wants me to". But how long will it want it? Time will tell.

Pablo Martín de Santa Olalla Saludes is professor of History of European Integration at the ESERP University Centre and author of the book 'Italia, 2013-2018. From chaos to hope' (Liber Factory, 2018).