The Italian centre-right's difficulties in forming a government

The overwhelming victory of the centre-right in the last general elections does not imply, and in practice will not imply, an easy formation of the new government that, in principle, should govern during the 20th Legislature (or rather, it should be said that it will begin governing, because it is difficult for there not to be a change of government at least once in between, following the tradition of the short duration of each government). Because Meloni, after clearly outstripping his two coalition partners (Berlusconi and Salvini), will first have to meet the conditions set by the President of the Republic to give his "approval" to the new government. But first she will have to reach a pact with the leaders of Forza Italia and the League, who not only have 33% of the parliamentarians in the new "maggioranza", but in practice form a "bloc" against Meloni. And she is the first to know it.

Traditionally, the person with the most votes in a coalition secures three posts: his or her own (Presidency of the Council of Ministers); the portfolio of Economy and Finance; and the all-important undersecretariat of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, an undersecretariat through whose hands all the information that ultimately goes to the head (in this case, head) of government passes. As for Economy and Finance, the name Meloni put forward for the elections was that of the former director general of the Bank of Italy and now member of the Board of Directors of the European Central Bank, Fabio Panetta, although another name could be considered: even the continuity of Daniele Franco, head of this portfolio in the Draghi government, who has done a very good job in the year and a half he has been in charge of it. But several names are being considered for the Undersecretary's post: from a veteran like Ignazio La Russa (although he could end up being President of the Senate, a chamber of which he has already been Vice-President in the previous legislature) to a woman very close to Meloni (Daniela Santanché). All this without forgetting the diplomat Terzi di Sant'Agata, who should go to Foreign Affairs, but whose rival is a man of the utmost importance for Meloni in relations with the European Union: Antonio Tajani, MEP for several legislatures and, finally, between January 2017 and June 2019, President of the European Parliament.

It should be remembered that for years the person who has accompanied the head of state or government to European summits has been none other than the head of foreign affairs, and Tajani belongs to the most important European political family (the People's Party, whose president is the German Manfred Weber). Tajani, an affable person, but also a person with character and who enjoys the maximum confidence of his leader (Silvio Berlusconi), will not ask Meloni for this portfolio, but rather Mattarella himself will surely demand that he be the one to take charge of it because Meloni has a weak position in the EU institutions, and there is no one better to act as an "ambassador introducer" than Tajani. So it should come as no surprise that in the end Terzi di Sant'Agata, who was also foreign minister during the Monti government (November 2011-April 2013), will be the one to whom Meloni entrusts this undersecretariat of the Council Presidency, although he could also become minister for European affairs.

This is precisely where Meloni's problems begin, and by far the most important one is what to do with her coalition partner (and in practice rival) Matteo Salvini. Because Salvini wants to return to the Viminale (the palace where the Interior Ministry is based), a post that gave him enormous lucidity between June 2018 and September 2019, and also knowing that the migration issue is once again a problem: if in 2021 arrivals to Italian shores were below 30,000 people, in 2022 these have risen to 64,000. So Salvini could return to his famous policy of "closed ports" to immigration, which would give him the possibility of losing some of his lost popularity.

For the moment, Matteo Salvini's League has already let it be known that it wants Interior, Agriculture (Salvini practices populism in the rural world with enormous effectiveness), Infrastructure and Transport (a ministry that could give him a great deal of exposure considering the enormous amount of European funds that will be available for modernisation of roads, bridges and other civil engineering works), and Constitutional Reforms. Within the latter is something that needs to be addressed as soon as possible, and that is the system for electing the President of the Republic. Let us recall that, in the last three calls to elect the head of state, two have ended in complete failure: Napolitano had to repeat her mandate in the spring of 2013 despite being no less than 88 years old at the time; and Mattarella, in turn, and in January of this year, had to assume a second mandate (remember that we are talking about no more and no less than seven years for a figure who usually arrives at the Quirinal already at an advanced age). In other words, in 16 years and three elections, only once (January 2015) was the Electoral College able to agree on a new President of the Republic: the aforementioned Sergio Mattarella, a candidate proposed by the then Prime Minister Matteo Renzi.

In reality, the fact that the head of state is elected by the citizens as a whole through a call to the polls, and not by an Electoral College made up basically of deputies, ministers and councillors from the governments of the 20 regions that make up the country, is the most logical solution and what would bring it into line with other republics in its neighbourhood, such as Germany (its current president is Franz-Walter Steinmeyer), Austria (Van der Bellen) or Portugal (Rebello da Sousa). However, it should not be forgotten that, unlike the aforementioned presidents (who assume the so-called "ceremonial role", without real executive functions), in the case of the Italian head of state, he has very important prerogatives, such as carrying out the "incarico" or "commission" of forming a government; deciding when to call elections; and, in practice, playing a key role in the formation of the new Executive, being able to veto candidates if he does not believe they will be beneficial for the country. In relation to this, the most recent case is that of Paolo Savona, proposed by Salvini and Di Maio at the end of May 2018 for Economy and Finance and whom Mattarella flatly refused to accept because he is a declared enemy of the single currency, resolving the conflict by sending Savona to the Ministry of European Affairs and appointing Giovanni Tría, a university professor and orthodox economist, to Economy and Finance.

Certainly, giving Agriculture and Infrastructure and Transport to Salvini is something Meloni can accept. But the fact that it will not be someone he trusts who is in charge of Constitutional Reforms and, even less, that it will be a person as conflictive as Salvini who will once again be in charge of the Interior are going to be two topics of strong discussion between these two leaders of the centre-right.

As for what Forza Italia might ask for, beyond Foreign Affairs, it is necessary to think about which ministries might be of interest to it, given that most of its former ministers are out of politics or the party: for example, the two ministers that Forza Italia appointed to the Draghi government are now in Renzi and Calenda's 'Il Terzo Polo', and the third (the Venetian Renato Brunetta) has decided to retire from politics. So we have to think of ministries for prominent figures like Maurizio Gasparri or Maurizio Lupi, but it will not be easy to find them. They will certainly not be in Justice, where Meloni has already had a name for months: Justice, the portfolio to which the prestigious magistrate Nordio, Meloni's candidate in the elections for the Presidency of the Republic in January 2022, should go.

In any case, the young Roman politician will have two important allies, and they are the two most prestigious figures in the country: Sergio Mattarella, President of the Republic, and Mario Draghi, acting Prime Minister. The former has a mandate until 2029 and enjoys immense popularity and prestige among Italians, while the latter remains the most influential figure in economic and financial circles. And both have in common a very bad relationship with Salvini: Mattarella has not forgotten that he wanted to throw the transalpine population on him with the so-called "Savona case" and the celebration of the anniversary of the Republic (2 June) in 2018. And Draghi, in turn, blames Salvini for the fall of his government, because, even if Cinque Stelle had left, between the League and Forza Italia they ensured the continuity of the "maggioranza", but Salvini preferred to bring down the Draghi government to finally end up paying for it in the elections, making good the saying that "he who brings down a government, then pays for it at the ballot box".

The reality is that there is still time. First the Houses of Parliament have to be constituted, their respective presidents elected and the committees that work within the legislative branch formed. Then it will be time to form the government, and in the meantime, the transalpine journalists will be able to continue with a favourite "sport": the so-called "toto-nomi", or what amounts to the same thing, giving and giving names of ministers for future portfolios until the definitive list is known. But, in any case, the future president of the Council of Ministers will have more than one headache in the formation of the government she will preside over because Salvini will fight her to the point of exhaustion simply because, for years (basically, June 2018 to February 2021) he thought that he, and not Meloni, would be the future prime minister, and this defeat at the hands of a rival that he almost didn't even consider is not taken in just like that, and even less so when it comes to Salvini.

Pablo Martín de Santa Olalla Saludes is Professor of International Relations at Nebrija University and author of the book "Historia de la Italia republicana (1046-2021)" (Sílex Ediciones, 2021).