Russia's neighbourhood in turmoil

Putin has always thought that the disappearance of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was a tidal wave and a catastrophe. He is right that it was a tsunami, because as the USSR disappeared, so did communism, the Cold War, the bipolar world, the threat of mutually assured destruction and the Russian empire itself in its post-Zarist version. However, it was also an unmitigated disaster for him and many other Russians because the former superpower, the USSR, has become what Barack Obama described as a "regional power" that has lost its security "glacis" and is now surrounded by hostile NATO countries, on the one hand, and by the Chinese economy, which is in a process of unbridled growth (economic but also military), on the other.

Putin is obsessed with the idea of restoring Russia to its past greatness, making it once again a superpower that must be counted on to decide the course of a world that he has no intention of leaving in the hands of the Americans and Chinese. For this purpose, it has two very powerful assets: a huge territory with access to the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Arctic; and the Russian people, aware of their history and of belonging to a great country, an old empire that has fallen apart without knowing very well how, and determined, by virtue of their nationalism, to accept sacrifices in order to recover the lost "grandeur". But it also has weaknesses such as a small and ageing population compared to that of the country's rivals, and a weak economy not only because of its size, as it is similar to Italy's, but also because it bases exports almost exclusively on gas and oil, which are currently low in price.

And, furthermore, it is suffering from sanctions imposed by the international community for acting in Ukraine and for annexing the Crimean Peninsula, which no one can ignore either because of its manifest illegality or because of the precedent it may set for other cases such as Taiwan. As if this were not enough, Putin's growing authoritarianism appears to be taking away support and sympathy both inside and outside the country. 

In order to achieve major power status, the Kremlin is fighting above its weight and it should be recognised that Putin is doing very well, particularly in the Middle East, where, by supporting Bachar al-Asad, he has become the dominant influence in Syria; and in Libya itself, where he is openly supporting Marshal Haftar in his bid for power. But these plans are complicated by its European and Caucasian policies.

In Europe, since Moscow has not managed to normalise relations with EU and member countries. In addition to Russia's policies in Ukraine and Crimea, it is now backing Lukashenko's pouting and the ongoing demands for freedom and democracy in Belarus, since Putin cannot allow a democratic path that would set a "bad example" for Russia to be followed there, bringing Minsk closer to the EU and, even worse, to NATO, thereby increasing the sense of siege that membership of the Baltic republics already gives Moscow. The fact that Russia has never had a democratic regime does not mean that it should ignore the wishes of others to achieve it. And Putin does not want that either outside or inside, as evidenced by the recent poisoning of the well-known opponent Alexander Navalni, in the line already suffered by others before.

Things are also complicated for Putin in the Caucasus. In Kyrgyzstan, the former Soviet republic (where there was a US base until 2014 during the Afghanistan war), disorder is spreading after the apparent pouting of the last elections, which were finally annulled by the Electoral Commission without any success in stopping the protests. The latest news is that Parliament elected as prime minister an individual freed by demonstrators from the prison where he was being held on charges of kidnapping. The only thing missing is for the mafias to come to power. The so-called Stans republics of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan), once part of the USSR, are now areas of competition between Russia, China and Turkey. With Erdogan, Turkey is another country that is fighting above its weight, as evidenced by its interventions in Syria and Libya (curiously against Russia's position), in addition to the dispute with Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and Israel over gas from the eastern Mediterranean. And Moscow finds these disputes for influence in the former Soviet territories both unpleasant and worrying.

The most difficult problem for Russia is the eternal conflict between Christian Armenia and Muslim Azerbaijan over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, which is populated by Armenians. When both countries were Soviet republics the problem did not arise, but with independence came war and Moscow helped broker a fragile agreement in 1994 which has not been honoured since. Fighting has resumed in recent weeks with many civilian casualties. The position of Moscow, which has a military base in Armenia, is compromised by the fact that Turkey has openly taken sides with Azeris through ethnic ties, while bad relations with Armenia come from behind (remember the Armenian genocide committed in 1916). Now Ankara has sent Syrian mercenaries to fight for Azerbaijan and the Armenians say a Turkish plane also shot down their own plane. The Russians have achieved a precarious cease-fire... and it is not respected, while Iran looks with much anxiety at this fight in its neighbourhood between distant powers. 

These are problems for Putin because he cannot claim to project the image of global power if he does not manage to solve the problems in the territories emerging from the old Soviet Union, and in order to do that he also needs to bring an increasingly fractious Turkey under control. This is not an easy task. 

Jorge Dezcallar. Ambassador of Spain